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IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
STALENESS OF THE RECORD
JAMES 0. FREEDMAN f
During the late nineteenth century, before "administrative law"
had become a part of the profession's working vocabulary, judges,
lawyers, and scholars were concerned with finding adequate rationaliza-
tions for the existence of administrative agencies. What could justify
the delegation of legislative authority to groups that quite clearly were
not the legislature?
The justifications, of course, were found and have long since car-
ried the day. One justification stressed an agency's superior institu-
tional ability to respond promptly to changes in the conditions being
regulated. "What are reasonable [rates] one month may not be so the
next," a Minnesota court said in 1888. "For a popular legislature
that meets only once in two years, and then only for 60 days, to attempt
to fix rates, would result only in the most ill-advised and haphazard
action, productive of the greatest inconvenience and injustice alike to
the railways and the public. If such a power is to be exercised at all,
it can only be satisfactorily done by a board or commission, constantly
in session, . . . who can change or modify these rates to suit the
ever-varying conditions of traffic." '
The court's rationale has not always been reflected in practice;
administrative agencies often respond hesitantly, "too late, or not at
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., Harvard College,
1957. LL.B., Yale University, 1962. Member, New Hampshire Bar. I am indebted
to Dennis R. Suplee of the Class of 1967 for his imaginative and painstaking assistance.
I Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago, M., & St. P. Ry.,
38 Minn. 281, 301, 37 N.W. 782, 788 (1888), rev'd, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
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all" 2 to the "ever-varying conditions" under their jurisdiction. Even
when they respond promptly, however, they are not always able to
prevent further changes from outrunning them. "Time runs out on
the Labor Board, as on other persons," ' the Second Circuit has said,
and, as it might have added, on other administrative agencies as well.
It could hardly be otherwise. The administrative process does
not exist in Eliot's "still point in time." That point-"the point of
intersection of the timeless/With time"-is not of this world; the
administrative process is. As Mr. justice Jackson once remarked, "Ad-
ministrative consideration of evidence--particularly where the evidence
is taken by an examiner, his report submitted to the parties, and a hear-
ing held on their exceptions to it-always creates a gap between the
time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is
promulgated. This is especially true if the issues are difficult, the
evidence intricate, and the consideration of the case deliberate and
careful." ' It is inevitable that changes in the record facts will some-
times occur during this time "gap." Further changes may occur before
judicial review is had.5 This means that a court will sometimes be
asked to enforce an administrative order based upon a record that does
not fully reflect the conditions existing at the time it was entered or,
in other cases, at the time that judicial review is had.'
How should a court respond when it is asked to enforce such an
order? Professor Jaffe has said that changed circumstances "present
the strongest case for agency reconsideration," ' particularly if they
would render enforcement "inequitable," offensive, or inappropriate,8
but that "the normal or standard rule is that events subsequent to the
issue of the order are immaterial." ' Courts have not been more
2
FRIENDLY, THE tEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 160 (1962) ; see BERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIssION 177 (1955); LANDIS, REPORT
ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELEcr 22-24 (1960) (printed for the
use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.).
a NLRB v. Cosmopolitan Studios, Inc., 291 F.2d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1961).
4 ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 514 (1944).
5 See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9 (1942) ("No court can
make time stand still. The circumstances surrounding a controversy may change
irrevocably during the pendency of an appeal, despite anything a court can do.").
6 Sometimes a court will be asked to enforce an administrative order entered
before a relevant change has been made in the law by statute, see Whitney Nat'l Bank
v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 424 (1965) ; Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 171-72 (1962), or by judicial decision. See Klissas v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 361 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The question of
the appropriate judicial response to such eventualities is beyond the scope of this article.
See Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 Y.A.,E L.J. .907, 912-15 (1962).
7 
JAFFE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Acrio 715 n.35 (1965) [herein-
after cited as JAFFE].
8 Id. at 264, 272.
9 JAFE & NATHANSON, CASES ON ADM:I NISTRATrVE LAW 772 (2d ed. 1961).
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explicit. Remand must be had, said one court, "where, even without
fault of the agency, the state of the record may preclude a 'just
result.' "'o Other courts have invoked "the general equity powers
which a court exercises in reviewing administrative action"; the order,
so runs the repeatedly recited phrase, must be "appropriate for present
enforcement," even as an equity order must."
These generalized formulations leave open all of the important
questions. When will a change in circumstances render enforcement
of an administrative order inequitable, offensive, or inappropriate?
What events occurring subsequent to the closing of the administrative
record or the issuance of an administrative order should be regarded
as material? When will the state of the record preclude a just result?
What conditions must exist before an administrative order is appro-
priate for present enforcement in an equity sense?
The subject is an important one because it asks, in one context,
the persistent question of the proper relationship between an admin-
istrative agency and a reviewing court.' And the answer which I
think the question requires-that a court's response must be rooted
primarily in considerations made relevant by the statute of the agency
which seeks enforcement of its order-supplies a commentary on the
hazardous enterprise of framing generalized rules of administrative
law.
13
Two recent Supreme Court decisions are a convenient starting
point. In both the Court relied upon the staleness of the administrative
record as the basis for remand. The cases presented attempts by the
Subversive Activities Control Board to enforce orders,'4 affirmed by the
10 Fleming v. FCC, 225 F.2d 523, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also LANDIS, THE
ADMIISTRATrE PROCESS 39 (1938).
11 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939) ; New Standard
Pub. Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Norfolk Shipbuilding
& Drydock Corp., 172 F.2d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 1949); cf. Tuscarora Indian Nation v.
FPC, 265 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
12 This article is concerned only with federal administrative agencies. At least
some parts of the present analysis may not be relevant to state administrative agencies,
e.g., the discussion premised on the desirability of avoiding decision of constitutional
questions.
'3 Compare Frankfurter & Nathanson, Forbidden Dialogue: Standards of Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, in 1963 SUPRE E CouRT REvimW 206 (Kurland ed.
1963), and Westwood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the Practitioner, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 607, 609 (1959), zith Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 H,,v. L. REv. 921, 923 (1965), and
GELLE oR & BysE, ADMINISTRATiE LAW ix (4th ed. 1960)..
14Rogers v. American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born, 2 S.A.C.B. 375
(1960), reaff'd sub nom. Kennedy v. American Comm. for Protection of Foreign
Born, 2 S.A.C.B. 439 (1962) ; Brownell v. Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
2 S.A.C.B. 26 (1955).
1966]
148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:145
court of appeals,'" that two organizations register as "Communist
fronts" under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.16 Al-
though it may be thought that the cases should be regarded as sui
generis, perhaps even as sports, they deserve and repay attention. They
are among a small number of Supreme Court decisions involving the
problem of staleness of an administrative record.17  In addition, they
provide a useful basis for the development of an analysis that has
relevance to other administrative agencies, to other regulatory statutes,
and to the problem of remand in general.'
Both cases were decided by per curiam opinions. In American
Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, the longer of the
two opinions, the Court outlined the facts underlying its decision to
remand the case to the Board:
In the present case the Board's findings that petitioner is
a "Communist front" were based primarily upon evidence
taken at a hearing which was concluded in 1955. The find-
ings which support the conclusion that the petitioner is con-
trolled by and primarily operated for the purpose of giving
aid and support to the Communist Party rest in substantial
measure upon evidence of the activities of Abner Green, found
to be a party member expressly assigned in 1941 to be peti-
tioner's executive secretary. Green died in 1959. The Board's
order was filed on June 27, 1960, but the record discloses no
findings or evidence concerning petitioner's activities after
Green's death. In the circumstances we think that the record
should be brought up to date to take account of supervening
events. Since a registration order operates prospectively, it
is apparent that reasonably current aid and control must be
established to justify a registration order. Our Communist
Party decision on the Communist-action provisions did not
necessarily foreclose petitioner's constitutional questions bear-
ing on the Communist-front provisions. Since petitioner's
current status is not clear on this record, decision of the
serious constitutional questions raised by the order is neither
necessary nor appropriate."
In Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB the Court gave
its reasons in shorter compass:
15 American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 331 F.2d 53 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) ; Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 331 F.2d 64 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
1664 Stat. 987 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1964). The Act is
Title I of the Internal Security Act.
17 See also DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966) (staleness of
state's basis for investigation into subversive activities).
Is The present analysis has implications, I think, for other grounds of remand
such as inconsistency and failure to state adequate reasons. I hope to explore some
of these implications in a subsequent article.
19380 U.S. 503, 504-05 (1965). A more detailed chronology appears in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas. Id. at 506 n.1.
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In this case, the order to register was based almost exclu-
sively on events before 1950, and very largely on events before
1940. The hearings themselves were concluded in November
1954, more than 10 years ago. On so stale a record we do not
think it is either necessary or appropriate that we decide the
serious constitutional questions raised by the order. See
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board.
2 0
The decisions turned upon a requirement that an order of the
Subversive Activities Control Board be based on a record reflecting
the "current status" of the organization being proceeded against. The
key sentence reads, "Since a registration order operates prospectively,
it is apparent that reasonably current aid and control must be established
to justify a registration order." " The Court went no further; it did
not supply authority or argument to support its choice of staleness as
the basis for remand.
It is understandable that the Court was not eager to decide the
merits. These were unusual cases. One need not be perspicacious to
believe that a majority of the Court shared the liberal consensus that
the legislative preferences embodied in the Act were profoundly unwise.
Had the Court taken up the merits, it might have been led to sustain
the "Communist-front" provisions of the Act, to hold, that is, that they
were not unconstitutional. By such a decision the Court would have
run the serious risk of being read as having said much more-as having
bestowed "the vital quality of legitimacy" ' on the legislative prefer-
ences of the Act. Of course, it is not at all clear that the Court would
have found itself compelled in a decision on the merits to sustain the
"Communist-front" provisions. A few Terms earlier, in Communist
Party v. SACB, the Court had upheld the sections of the Act that
were the most defensible-those directed at "Communist-action" groups
such as the Communist Party-by only a narrow margin. And during
the previous Term, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,) the Court had
held unconstitutional a section of the Act relating to passport denials.
The Court did not overstate when it said that these cases presented
20 380 U.S. 513, 514 (1965). The Brigade's activities during the Spanish Civil
War are discussed in BROME, THE INTERNATIONAL BRIGADEs 105-18 (1966).
21380 U.S. at 505.
22 BLAiCK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 117 (1960).
23 367 U.S. 1 (1961). The Court in the Communist Party case carefully limited
its holding to cases involving foreign-dominated organizations having the objective
of overthrowing the government and establishing a totalitarian regime. See also
American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 331 F.2d 53, 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
24378 U.S. 500 (1964). See also Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
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"serious constitutional questions." ' Either decision on the merits
would have had uneasy consequences: by the one the Court would
have run the risk of being read as having "legitimated" a statute that
it almost surely regarded as unwise in policy, by the other it would
have held unconstitutional a statute passed (over a presidential veto)
by a coordinate branch of government.
The Court avoided deciding the merits by remanding on the ground
of staleness. It did not, it is true, locate the staleness rationale ex-
plicitly in the statute. It is also true that "the Court's omission of a
particular known and available ground" 26 of decision is sometimes
significant. Is the significance here that the Court regarded staleness
as an undifferentiated ground of general application in cases arising
from administrative agencies? There is reason to think not.
The meaning of the "Communist-front" registration provisions
of the Act had been explored carefully by the court of appeals. The
court had found, in both the language and the policy of the statute, an
evidentiary requirement that the Attorney General's proof of status be
"timely." In National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v.
SACB, the opinion in which the subject is discussed most extensively,
the court said:
First, the provisions of the statute are phrased in the present
tense. The statutory definition of a Communist front is cast
in the present tense. A Communist-front organization is one
which is (not was or has been) substantially directed, etc., and
is primarily operated, etc. The restrictions are upon those
who are members when the organization is registered or the
order requiring registration becomes final. And this would
seem to be designedly so, because the public interest is in the
activities of such organizations in the present and the potential
future. This is not a punitive statute for past affairs. The
question on this record and under the statute is whether this
Council was a Communist-front organization at the time of
the inquiry by the Board. This is an important factor in the
case.
2 7
25 See, e.g., Chafee, The Registration of "Communist-Front" Organizations in the
Mundt-Nixon Bill, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1382 (1950) ; Sutherland, Freedom and Internal
Security, 64 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1951) ; Note, The Registration of Communist-Front
Organizations: The Statutory Framework and the Constitutional Issue, 113 U. PA.
L. Ruv. 1270, 1283-94 (1965).
President Truman's veto message relied heavily on the view that "the application
of the registration requirements to so-called Communist-front organizations can be
the greatest danger to freedom of speech, press, and assembly, since the Alien and
Sedition Laws of 1798." 96 CONG. REc. 15630 (1950). The unconstitutionality of
the statute was also argued in Congress. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 15701 (1950)
(remarks of Senator Kefauver) ; 96 CONG. RFc. 13745 (1950) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Doyle). But see McCarran, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 481, 489-95 (1951).
26 Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 HAxv. L. Rxv. 56, 97 (1965).
27 322 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (emphasis in original).
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In American Committee the court of appeals alluded to this dis-
cussion in order to incorporate it by reference." In Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade it restated a part of it: "The statute is cast
in the present tense. It is not designed to produce historical treatises.
It is designed to compel the public registration of organizations which,
subsequent to the passage of the Act, operate to aid the aims of the
Communist movement. This time element is not a technicality, or a
happenstance, or a matter of semantics. It is a basic concept." 29 The
concept of what the Supreme Court came to call a "current status"
record was basic exactly because the "1930's, '40's and '50's, i.e., the
years before, during and after World War II, witnessed three dif-
ferent policy periods in the relationships between the Soviet Union
and the United States." " Activity during these periods, although
telling when raised in political debate, was not relevant to a statute
that, as a control device, sought "to prevent by exposure and sanction
the accomplishment of defined Communist aims in this country." 31
The statutory basis for the requirement of a "current status"
record, then, was strong. The Subversive Activities Control Act was
not "designed to produce historical treatises" or "to exhume skeletons
and condemn them to perpetual infamy." 82 Enforcement of an order
based upon a stale record could have just those results.3 The Supreme
Court's statement that "since a registration order operates prospectively,
it is apparent that reasonably current aid and control must be estab-
lished to justify a registration order," might well be read as a short-
hand summary of the statutory purpose argument worked out by the
court of appeals.3 4
The facts in American Committee make clear precisely how stale
the record was. The Board's findings that the Committee was a
"Communist front" were based, as the Court said, "primarily upon
evidence taken at a hearing which was concluded in 1955." 8 The
Board's order was not issued until 1960. And although the Board's
28 331 F.2d at 55.
2 331 F2d at 67-68. See also id. at 69 n.10. Although the court of appeals
sustained the Board's order, Judge Bazelon dissented on the ground that the record
"was stale when the Board made its findings." Id. at 74.
80 Id. at 68.81 Note, 74 YAr.F L.J. 738, 743 (1965).
82 1d. at 743; see Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322 F2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir.
1963) ("We do not perceive that the registers are designed either as history books
or as fiction.").
33 The existence of a final order-finalized by this court-would appear to
establish the present existence of the organization and its Communist-front
nature. The appearance of actuality thus created would be a reasonable
inference.
Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322 F.2d 364, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
34 See International Union of Mine Workers v. SACB, 353 F.2d 848, 849 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
38380 U.S. at 504. See also 331 F.2d at 70 ("Almost startling is the fact that
so little of the evidence relates to 1950 or years thereafter.").
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findings rested "in substantial measure upon evidence of the activities
of Abner Green," " the record disclosed no evidence or findings with
respect to the Committee's activities after his death in 1959. Thus,
in sum, the Board in 1965 was asking the Court to enforce an order
entered in 1960, based upon a five-year old record that did not take
into account (whether or not it should have changed the administra-
tive result) the death of the Committee's "top functionary" and "most
influential official" " the year before. In a universe governed by a
statute limiting administrative action to prospective impact, the fact of
Abner Green's death four years after the closing of the record makes
a persuasive case for remand.
There were, to be sure, elements in the cases that might have
counseled against remand or at least have suggested limitations on
the offices that remand could perform.
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court's decisions to remand
was to avoid a decision on the validity of the Board's orders, which
is to say a decision on the "serious constitutional questions" pre-
sented. The staleness rationale was the Court's basis of avoidance.
As such, it shares some of the qualities of the Court's more con-
ventional devices for avoiding constitutional adjudication on the
merits-the doctrines of ripeness and exhaustion of administrative
remedies, for example, that Professor Bickel celebrates as "passive
virtues." "8 By using the rationale of staleness, the Court did not
refuse for all time to pass upon the Board's orders; it merely put off
passing upon them until the records had been developed further.
More highly developed records, assuming that the constitutional ques-
tions persisted after action on remand, would at least provide an
enlarged factual context in which to explore the reach of the questions
and might well cast them in a different light. By so doing, remand
might supply the Court with a greater sense of confidence that the
constitutional questions had been structured in as many dimensions
and presented in as much depth as might be thought useful to wise
adjudication.
The persuasiveness of this rationale depends upon one's estimate
of how useful additional factual information might be. If the questions
that American Committee and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade presented can properly be regarded as relating primarily to
36 380 U.S. at 504.
STId. at 508-09 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; see 331 F.2d at 55-56.
38 Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961), in
SELEcTED ESSAYS ON CoNsruTIoNAL LAW 1938-62, at 24 (1963); BIcKE, THE
LAST DANGEROUS BRANCH ch. 4 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BicKm]. Compare
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUm. L. Rxv. 1 (1964).
[Vol.l15:145
REMAND IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
the constitutionality of the statute as applied, additional factual in-
formation plainly would be helpful. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting
in opinions joined by two other members of the Court, may have
believed that the cases presented questions of the constitutionality of
the statute on its face; he wrote, "All of the relevant facts one needs
to know to resolve the constitutional question are exposed in the
present record." ' If this is the proper characterization of the ques-
tions, additional factual information would be less helpful, although in
particular cases the actual operation of a statute can be critical to a
determination of its constitutionality on its face. The Court's orders
to remand, then, conceivably could serve the purpose of improving the
quality of the decision of the constitutional questions presented, how-
ever they are characterized.
Often, however, in remanding a case to an agency, a court may
hope to achieve more than just an enlargement of the range and
particularity of the record. It may hope to provide the agency with
an opportunity to consider-once the court has announced its assess-
ment that the agency's action raises serious questions of validity-
whether regulatory exigencies finally require that the questions be
pressed." Until the court has spoken, the agency may not be
sensitive to the possibility that its decision threatens constitutional
values. Remand has the capacity for inviting a dialogue with an
agency on the "preliminary question how importunately the occasion
demands" 4 that this course of action be followed, to the rejection of
other, perhaps less effective, courses that have the simple virtue of
being clearly constitutional. As such, remand can be a device for
moderating the inadvertent or precipitous presentation of questions
of basic legality.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. Dulles,' although it
did not result in an order to remand, provides a provocative illustra-
tion when juxtaposed with the decisions in American Committee and
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. The issue in Kent was
the validity of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State pur-
suant to a general statutory authorization to "grant and issue pass-
ports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and
prescribe . . . . " The regulations required passport applicants
to "subscribe, under oath or affirmation, to a statement with respect
39 380 U.S. at 514.
40 See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). The Commission's
response on remand appears in Jacob Siegel Co., 43 F.T.C. 256 (1946).
4 1 HAND, THE BIL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958).
42 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
4344 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964). The Court quotes the relevant
sections of the statute in its opinion. 357 U.S. at 123.
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to present or past membership in the Communist Party." ' Kent
challenged the constitutionality of this requirement. The Court found
that it "would be faced with important constitutional questions" I
if the statute authorized the regulations; by granting the Secretary
"authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or
associations," " Congress at least would have approached and might
have trenched upon the right to travel guaranteed by the fifth
amendment.
The Court did not accept Kent's challenge in his terms. Instead,
it held as a matter of statutory construction that Congress had not
delegated to the Secretary the authority to condition the issuance
of passports upon an applicant's beliefs or associations. At least
"Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms," 17 the Court
said, and that, taken with a century of historical practice, was enough
to support a narrow reading.48 One effect of the Supreme Court's
decision was to avoid a decision on the "important constitutional ques-
tions" presented. Another effect, and a more significant one, was to
create conditions conducive to reconsideration of the requirement in
question.
The Court's decision in Kent held that the regulations issued by
the Secretary were invalid because Congress had not authorized the
Secretary to issue them. Quite obviously, it would have been
supererogatory for the Court then to have asked the Secretary to
develop the record more fully or to reconsider whether he wanted to
issue these particular regulations. The Court, by its decision, was not
speaking to the Secretary. But it was, clearly enough, speaking to
Congress.
The Court, in an important sense, was instructing Congress that
a policy choice to require that passport applicants supply a statement
as to their past or present membership in Communist organizations
would invite searching constitutional inquiry. The Court did not tell
Congress to make that choice or to avoid making it; but it did give
Congress the chance-whether Congress would choose to take it is
another question-to reconsider the choice with an awareness that it
would implicate fundamental values. "This," as Professor Bickel
44 17 Fed. Reg. 8014 (1952). See 357 U.S. at 118 n.2.
45 357 U.S. at 130.
48 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
4The Court's reading of the prior historical practice was sharply disputed by
the dissenting opinion and elsewhere has been characterized as "fictive." Bickm 201;
see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport
Problem, 35 FoEIGN AFFARs 17, 22-23 (1956) ; cf. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
and the Reading of Statutes, in FELix FRAx.,NFuaRn: TH JunDG 30, 44 (Mendelson
ed. 1964).
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has written, "was remanding to Congress for a second look-not for
the necessary initial decision, but for orderly, deliberate, explicit, and
formal reconsideration of a decision previously made, but made back-
handedly, off-handedly, less explicitly than is desirable with respect
to an issue of such grave importance." " The Court's decision in
Kent, by interpreting the statute narrowly, created the opportunity for
a "sober second thought" 50 by Congress: Was it necessary or useful
or wise to grant the Secretary the authority he had thought he possessed
if to do so would be to press constitutional questions? The initiative
lay with Congress."
By comparison with the disposition in Kent, the Court in
American Committee and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
was not speaking to Congress." It is true that Congress could have
responded to the Court's assertion of constitutional doubts by repealing
or modifying the Act to remove them, but political realities would
surely have made that an unlikely eventuality. The Court, instead, was
speaking to the Board. But this does not necessarily mean that pro-
ceedings on remand will result in consideration of the "serious con-
stitutional questions" that troubled the Court.
The reason lies in the institutional limitations of the Board. The
Board does not have the freedom, as Congress does, to repeal or
modify a statute under the pressure of constitutional doubts. It is
hornbook law that "we do not commit to administrative agencies the
power to determine constitutionality of legislation" 5' when the chal-
lenge is to the face of the statute. If the challenge that American
Committee and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade present is
properly spoken of as directed at the statute on its face, the Board
"can hardly be expected to entertain" 1 the questions which it raises;
in short, the constitutional questions would not receive consideration
4 9 BIcKEL 165-66. Compare DOWLING & GUNTHER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 161-62 (7th ed. 1965). My reading of the decision in Kent quite obviously relies
upon Professor Bickel's analysis. The question of "remanding to Congress for a
second look" is explored in Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAv. L. Rxv. 1 (1957) ; Wellington, Machinists
v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, in 1961
SuPRamE COURT REvIEW 49 (Kurland ed. 1961).
to Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936).
Compare WYZANSKI, WaEEAs-A JuDGE's PREMISES 162 (1965); Schwartz, Legal
Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial
Responsibility, 67 HAv. L. Rxv. 436, 475 (1954).
61 Compare Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 509 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring
specially). For the estimate that in Kent the "Court's action in remanding the issue
to Congress bore some fruit," see BICKEL 166.
42 The possibility that the Court might have been able to speak to Congress by
granting the statute a narrow construction is discussed in Note, 74 YALE L.J. 738,
747-51 (1965). Compare Note, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COLUm. L.
REV. 606, 609-13 (1951).
53 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04, at 74 (1958).
44 Public Util. Com'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958).
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on remand.5 The system does, it is true, commit to administrative
agencies the power to determine the "constitutional applicability of
legislation to particular facts"; 5' when questions of this kind are
presented, remand can result in fruitful consideration.17  Although
the Court has not been clear or consistent in fashioning a distinguishing
rule,5" these cases almost certainly should be regarded as presenting
5 Of course, the Board could avoid pressing the constitutional questions by de-
ciding to drop the proceedings, or the Attorney General could so petition the Board.
But this course, if it rested on no further reasons than a desire to escape a declaration
on the constitutional issues, would render enforcement of the statute a dead letter.
The Board is more likely to take the course of pressing the constitutional questions
in carefully selected cases in which it believes that its chances of prevailing are best.
50 3 DAvis, ADMiNiSTRATvE LAW TREATiSE § 20.04, at 74 (1958).
An administrative agency also has the power "initially [to] apply a broad statu-
tory term to a particular situation." Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367
(1965) ; see NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) ; Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1941) ; Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470 (1950); Nathanson, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and Administrative Law, 67 YALE L.J. 240, 262-63 (1957). This sug-
gests why the conceit of remand as a colloquy between court and agency is more apt
in cases raising questions about the limits of an agency's statutory authority than it is
in cases raising questions about the limits of Congress' constitutional authority.
57 Commissioner Eastman's statement remains persuasive:
Every candid person who has studied the "due-process" clause and the many
cases where it has been successfully or unsuccessfully invoked will concede
that it offers wide scope for judicial interpretation, that in the process of
interpretation the court is, and of necessity must be, guided largely by its
conception of what is inherently just and consistent with a sound public
policy, and that such conception is not a constant but a variable quantity
dependent upon the political and economic views, habits of thought, extent
of knowledge, and degree of enlightenment prevailing not only in the court
but in the community generally .
In determining such questions knowledge of pertinent facts and an ex-
perience which makes it possible to visualize the probable results of a par-
ticular public policy are quite as important as familiarity with the law books.
It is an instance in which the law is influenced if not governed by the facts.
When, therefore, the question relates to the constitutional limits of the public
regulation of railroads, an intimate knowledge of railroads, of their relations
with and their importance to the shipping and investing classes and to the
public generally, and of their past history and future prospects becomes of
the highest consequence. Such knowledge it is the peculiar duty of this com-
mission to acquire. As to such matters it occupies a daily front seat upon
the stage, while the Supreme Court of necessity is only an occasional visitor
in the balcony. Whether the commission has the ability to make the best use
of its opportunities for knowledge may be open to debate, but at least it must
proceed upon that assumption.
I can not avoid the conclusion that the commission would be derelict in
its duty in this case if it should confine its attention, so far as the fundamental
law is concerned, to past utterances of the court in more or less analogous
cases and should neglect the illumination which is thrown upon the law by its
own intimate knowledge of transportation affairs and problems. . . . After
the court has heard what we have to say it may decide that our conclusions
as to the fundamental law are erroneous, and that will end the matter; but
certainly we ought not to deprive the court of the help which it may gain
from the special knowledge which it is our duty under the law to acquire.
Excess Income of St. L. & 0. Ry., 124 I.C.C. 3, 50-51 (1927) (concurring opinion),
modified, 22 F.2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 1927), rev'd, 279 U.S. 461 (1929).
58 Compare United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), with Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). Cf. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, in 1960 SUPREME COURT REvIEw 75, 89-95 (Kurland ed. 1960); Alfange,
The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 637,
661-67 (1966).
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challenges to the constitutionality of the statute on its face. There is
little in their facts to suggest that they stand in a different relation
to the statute than other cases arising under it had or would. If the
orders to remand were based upon a view that the cases presented
challenges to the constitutionality of the statute as applied, it is surpris-
ing that the Court did not make this plain so that the Board might
have known what was expected of it.
The relevance of the comparison with Kent v. Dulles, then, lies
in its suggestion that for institutional reasons the decisions to remand
in American Committee and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
could not be expected to result in consideration of "serious constitu-
tional questions" concerning the statute on its face. Therefore, it
seems likely that the most certain function that remand could perform,
other than avoidance of the constitutional questions or mere temporiza-
tion with the Board, would be to bring the records into compliance
with the "current status" requirement of the Act, although it also might
result in the production of additional factual information that would
be useful to the Court in determining the constitutionality of the
statute, even on its face.
For Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, there were further reasons
for believing that remand was not appropriate. In the first of the
cases, the Committee had made no attempt, before the Board or before
the court below, to allege facts showing that Abner Green's death had
converted it into "a legally different entity." " It had "made no effort
to reopen the record for evidence concerning Green's successor, any
new policies now in effect, or the like," " nor had it asked the court
of appeals to remand the case for the taking of new evidence, although
both courses were open to it. And in the companion case, "None
of the parties before us has suggested that the record is stale or in-
complete . . . . None of the parties before us has suggested that
we need to know more about the Brigade since the Board's decision
in 1955." 61 These are relevant arguments that might have pre-
vailed in another context, 62 but it seems proper that they did not
prevail here.
That neither party has requested a remand has not generally been
allowed to control the question in similar cases. Courts have remanded
cases to administrative agencies even though all the parties to the
r9 380 U.S. at 507 rL2. But see id. at 504-05 n.1.
6o Id. at 507 n.2.
61 Id. at 516.
6 2 See, e.g., Colorado Radio Corp. v. FCC, 118 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; R.C.A.
Communications, Inc. v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 851, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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appeal have urged that the merits be decided now.' As a matter of
judicial administration, the practice is plainly necessary. When a
court sits to enforce an administrative order that a "Communist-
front" organization register with the Board, it sits much as a court of
equity; the court "is involved in the judgment, not simply negatively
by way of veto, but affirmatively." ' Violation of the Board's order
carries no sanction until it has been enforced by a court.65 "The
decree, when entered, is a judicial order," " as Judge Prettyman has
written. Violation of the decree is not merely contempt of court, as
is usually the case when a court decrees enforcement of an adminis-
trative order, but a criminal offense as well . 7  When a court becomes
this "positively implicated in the enforcement of the law," ' it is right
that it be satisfied by its own standards with the state of the record
upon which an enforcement order will be based.
Both experience and common sense suggest that a court which
takes the parties' judgment as to the desirability of a present decision
on the existing record will do so at a risk. Parties are adversaries,
properly so, whose concern for the integrity of a court's equity
processes cannot be assumed to be as sensitive as a court's. In
American Committee, for example, it would be understandable if the
Board, having experienced several postponements already, were "inter-
ested in bringing a prolonged case to a close"' and knowing the
satisfaction of winning. The Committee's incentive to raise the issue
of staleness may not have been greater. Having been involved in
what increasingly must have seemed an administrative war of harass-
ment and attrition, the Committee might understandably be impatient
63 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965); Fleming v. FCC,
225 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Compare Communist Party v. SACB, 351 U.S. 115
(1956).
64 JAFFE 264; cf. Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
6564 Stat 1001 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1964). Although an
order of the Board may become final "upon the expiration of the time allowed for
filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time,"
64 Stat. 1001 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1) (1964), this will not be
the usual method.
66 NLRB v. Eanet, 179 F.2d 15, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
6764 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §794 (1964). Contempt of court, of course,
can ripen into a jail sentence, see NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 354 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1965), but it is rare for this to happen. Cf. Note, Use of Contempt Power To
Enforce Subpoenas an Orders of Administrative Agencies, 71 -Luxv. L. REV. 1541
(1958).
8 JAFFE 264. The court is further implicated by the statutory requirement that
Board orders be supported by "the preponderance of the evidence," rather than by
the usual formulation of substantial evidence. 64 Stat. 1001 (1950), as amended,
50 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1964); see 96 CONG. REc. 14531 (1950) (remarks of Senator
Ferguson); 96 CONG. REc. 13765 (1950) (remarks of Representative Nixon).
69 Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 939, 948 (1966). :.
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to be rid of the proceedings and to win, finally, a vindication of its
constitutional claims and an exoneration of its name.70
The attitude of the parties, then, ought not be allowed to foreclose
inquiry into the possibility that with Green's death the record no
longer reflected the character of the Committee. Mr. Justice Douglas
was satisfied to make that inquiry himself. The testimony adduced
before the Board makes clear, he wrote, "that the organization had
an existence above and beyond Green himself." 71 But ordinarily an
assessment of the Committee's operations "above and beyond Green
himself" would in the first instance be for the Board to make.72 As
the court of appeals said in a subsequent case involving the Board, "It
is the Board-and not this court-which must first determine status
on a reasonably current record." 7
But what if Abner Green had not died? Would the Court none-
theless have found the lapses of time since compilation of the record
(ten years) or entry of the Board's order (five years) a sufficient basis
for remand? The answer almost certainly is that it would. Indeed,
in Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, where the hearings were
concluded "more than 10 years ago" I and there was no allegation
of any specific change of circumstance since, the Court found just
that. Given the extended lapse of time since the record was closed,
the decision to remand may well reflect a practical assumption that
relevant changes in circumstances have probably occurred in the
interim.
75
Courts have made such an assumption in other cases. For
example, in WORZ, Inc. v. FCC,7 a license proceeding which three
70 On November 1, 1965, the court of appeals remanded to the Board a case
ordering a union to register as a "Communist-infiltrated" organization. The remand
was based upon the decisions in American Committee and Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade. International Union of Mine Workers v. SACB, 353 F.2d 848 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). On June 13, 1966, the Attorney General moved the Board to vacate the
order. The union's president described the Attorney General's decision as "a vindi-
cation after ten years of harassment" of the union's denial that it was "Communist
infiltrated." N.Y. Times, June 15, 1966, p. 51, col. 5 (city ed.).
71380 U.S. at 509.
72 Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 428 (1947) ; Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 334 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
73 International Union of Mine Workers v. SACB, 353 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
74 380 U.S. at 513.
75 Compare International Union of Mine Workers v. SACB, 353 F.2d 848, 850-51
(D.C. Cir. 1965), in which remand was ordered. The court stated the chronology as
follows:
This proceeding was initiated by the Attorney General on July 28, 1955.
Iearings did not get under way until February 25, 1957, and continued inter-
mittently until March 10, 1961. The examiner's recommended decision was
forthcoming December 26, 1961 ; and the Board's order was issued May 4, 1962.
76345 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Mid-Florida Television Corp.
v. FCC, 382 U.S. 893 (1965).
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times came up on appeal and three times was sent back, the court on
the third appeal expressed "a nagging uncertainty" as to whether the
public interest would be "adequately effectuated by confining the choice
to these two applicants in the light of facts put on the record over ten
years ago." " In ten years the character of a community-the com-
position of its population, the configuration of its economy, the nature
of its communications media--can change significantly.78 The court
ordered the Commission to reopen the proceeding and to hold a new
hearing. Similarly, in NLRB v. Eanet " the court declined to enforce
a Labor Board order directing an employer to bargain collectively "with
a named union on the basis of a showing that more than two years
ago the union had been selected by six out of nine or ten bellboys,
maids and a houseman in this small hotel." " The court supported
its decision by reference to the "common knowledge that the personnel,
such as bellboys, elevator operators, maids and janitors, of small hotels
constantly changes." 8"
There will inevitably be cases, however, in which (1) the court's
attention is not drawn to any specific changes in circumstances com-
parable in significance to Abner Green's death, and in which (2) the
time lapse, although lengthy, is not as extended as it was in American
Committee and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Should
these cases, too, be remanded on the basis of a working assumption
that there probably have been significant changes in the circumstances
upon which the Board's order rests? This is the question, mutatis
mutandis, of determining the relevant time at which the adminis-
trative record must establish the "current status" of an organization
as a "Communist front."
The Subversive Activities Control Act does not provide an answer;
Congress did not speak to the issue in terms. The Supreme Court,
beyond saying that "the record should be brought up to date to
take account of supervening events," ' did not speak to the issue either.
The court of appeals had selected "the time of hearing or reasonably
77 Id. at 86. But see Illinois Cent. R.R v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. - (1966).
78 See Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 939, 947-48 (1966).
-79 179 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also NLRB v. Prigg, 172 F.2d 948 (5th
Cir. 1949).
80 179 F.2d at 17.
81 Ibid. If the court's decision to deny enforcement rests on this ground alone,
it is difficult to harmonize with the authorities. Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702
(1944) ; NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563, 568 (1950). However,
as the court's opinion on rehearing suggests, several pressures were at work to compel
the result of non-enforcement: the court's doubts that the employer's hotel had any
impact on interstate commerce, the absence of substantial evidence, the court's sense
that this was an "extremely minor" matter best settled by negotiation. 179 F.2d
at 17-21.
82 380 U.S. at 504-05.
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close to it." ' The Supreme Court, on the chronology presented, found
this date too early, although it is not clear that it would hold the
same way in cases in which the administrative decision was reached
and judicial review had in more typical course. The suggestion that
as a result of these decisions "the Government will have to keep its
case timely through the entire litigation "8 cannot be accepted; if it
were, a vicious cycle would be created in which the conditions of
judicial enforcement would be impossible of attainment 5 Perhaps
the most that can be said in cases of the present description is that the
administrative record must provide a reliable demonstration of what
the character and activity of the organization being proceeded against
are likely to be at the time that the Board's order is enforced and
for some time thereafter.
But what is "a reliable demonstration"? The judgment must be
a prudential one, and such judgments can be made wisely only on a
case-by-case basis. Some records will make out a more compelling
case for a decision to remand than others, even though the lapses of
time since the records were closed may be of about the same length.
Several factors that will contribute to this decision have already been
mentioned: the relative importance that the statutory design attaches
to current findings of fact in the achievement of statutory objectives,
the comparative usefulness of additional factual information to resolu-
tion of any constitutional questions presented (which may depend upon
the relative seriousness, difficulty, or novelty of the questions), the
degree to which a court's equity powers may be implicated in the
enforcement of the administrative order. There will be other factors
as well; although it is not possible to catalog all of the factors that will
be at play in any given case, it is possible to suggest what some of
them may be.
The particular facts set forth in the administrative record often
will say a great deal about the stability of the organization that the
Board has ordered to register. Some records will describe groups
that have histories of organizational cohesion and doctrinal continuity.
Because, as the Supreme Court has said, "institutions, like other
organisms, are predominantly what their past has made them," 86 it
8 3 Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 331 F.2d 64, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1963) ; see National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. SACB, 322 F.2d
375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("The question on this record and under this statute is
whether this Council was a Communist-front organization at the time of the inquiry
by the Board.").
84 Note, The Registratitn of Communist-Front Organizations: The Statutory
Franework and the Constitutional Issue, 113 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1270, 1277 (1965).
85 Compare Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB, 331 F.2d 76, 84 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
86 Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 69 (1961).
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may be possible in such cases for a court to conclude that an organiza-
tion that had a certain policy and program in the past "has the same
policy and program in the present." 87 Other records will describe
organizations that have characteristically been beset by factional strife
and signal fluctuations in membership, energy, and ideology. Such
records more insistently raise the likelihood of significant intervening
change. The question will be whether they do so with sufficient force
to justify remand when actual changes have not been demonstrated
and the length of the lapse of time is not by itself necessarily per-
suasive. A court deals here in hints and guesses. In some cases,
which means in cases falling at either end of a continuum, a court
may be able fairly to draw the inference that the character of an
organization is quite likely or quite unlikely to have changed per-
tinently since the record was made.
However, in most cases the state of the record will preclude a
court from drawing either inference with confidence. Then a court
must consider other factors in deciding whether to remand. These
will include the effect that remand will have upon the life of the
organization involved and upon the responsibilities of the Board.
Consideration of these factors raises issues in several dimensions.
Organizations that attract the Attorney General's attention and
engage the Board's processes are typically more notorious, even
boisterous, than affluent."8 A new round of proceedings will mean a
new outlay in litigation costs of funds that are likely to be scarce
already. In addition, a new round of proceedings, by perpetuating
the cloud hanging over an organization's head, may mean that prospec-
tive members will be discouraged from joining and present members
from remaining. A court contemplating remand can hardly be un-
aware that depletion of an organization's lifeblood-its financial re-
sources and its membership--can occur in the interim (just as courts
87 Communist Party v. SACB, 223 F.2d 531, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd, 351
U.S. 115 (1956).
8 8
1n Weinstock v. SACB, 331 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the United May Day
Committee, apparently unable to afford a lawyer, appealed a registration order on
the basis of briefs filed in another case "insofar as any points of Constitutional Law
are raised therein." Ibid. See also National Council of American-Soviet Friendship,
Inc. v. SACB, 301 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1962); CHAFF, THE BL.ssINGS OF LIBERTY
143 (1956).
The Attorney General recently filed a petition with the Board seeking an order
requiring that the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America register as a "Communist-front'
organization. Katzenbach v. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs, No. 127-66, SACB, Mar. 4,
1966. The Clubs are youth groups with chapters located primarily on college campuses.
STAFF OF SUBCOMM., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT
ON COMMUNIST YOUTH PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1966) ; Hearings Before the Subcom-
inittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 3 (1965).
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can hardly be unaware of the consequences to the plaintiff of reversing
a personal injury verdict and remanding for a new trial)9
If this is an approach from what might be called the private
interest of the organization ordered to register, it is necessary to
acknowledge an important limitation. The concept of a private in-
terest as a consideration of general application in the decision-making
processes of administrative agencies has not often been articulated by
courts.' This is not surprising. The price of maintaining a society
in which the Government has a responsibility to act and in which its
actions are made subject to judicial review must sometimes come high.
Moreover, although most regulatory statutes command an agency to
act in the public interest, none mandates an agency in haec verba to
give weight to any private interest. None of this is to say that a
private right argument can never be made; it is only to say that such
an argument, if it is to be successful, must be rooted in considerations
made relevant by statutory policy. Do the materials exist, then, for
the creation of a private right argument from the policy of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act?
The basic policy of the Act is often described as the identification
of organizations that have a relationship to the Communist "move-
ment" or "network" in the United States and to "the world Communist
movement itself." "' The Act, it is said, seeks to bring such organiza-
tions "out into the open where the public can evaluate their activities
informedly against the revealed background of their character, nature,
and connections." 9 This purpose underlies the registration provisions
of the Act ' as well as the provisions requiring that registered organi-
zations affix to any publication transmitted through the mails the
89 See CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LlBmETY 155 (1956).
It may be relevant for a court to consider whether the staleness of the record
can be attributed to delay caused by the "fault" of the agency. An agency that has
caused substantial unjustified delay ought not be allowed the opportunity to cause
further delay during remand proceedings when delay saps the life of the organization
involved. In the present cases the long lapse of time since the closing of the records
was not caused by the Board's "fault." It was caused, instead, by a decision to await
the Supreme Court's disposition of Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
The "Communist-front" provisions of the Act could not come into play until the
"Communist-action" provisions had been sustained in the Communist Party case.
The proceedings were twice held up, once before the Board and once before the court
of appeals, pending the Supreme Court's decision. 380 U.S. at 506 n.1.
Q0 Compare FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), with Jaffe,
Adventures in Administrative Law, in FErIx FRANKFURTER: THE JuDGE 206, 211
(Mendelson ed. 1964). Cf. WHDH, Inc., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 340, 342 (FCC
1964).
9164 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §781(15) (1964).
92 Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 103 (1961); see McCarran, The
Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. Prrr. L. REv. 481, 484 (1951); Note, The
Registration of Communist-Front Organizations: The Statutory Framework and the
Constitutional Issue, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1270, 1271 (1965).
9364 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1964).
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legend, "Disseminated by , a Communist organization." 94
If there were no other provisions to the Act, one might argue that
it was designed to achieve identification only. The argument would
add that the Act therefore was not designed to achieve the more severe
result of driving an identified organization out of existence, except as
public opinion might have that effect. 5  This argument would lead
to the conclusion that a court should be concerned when it is proceed-
ings in enforcement of the Act which threaten that result.
It seems plain, however, that the statute provides for more than
just identification. The statute is a control device, as Congress said
in the finding of necessity, "designed to prevent [the world-wide Com-
munist conspiracy] from accomplishing its purpose in the United
States." 96 What could not be achieved by exposure, it sought to
achieve by other means. Thus, criminal provisions of the Act prohibit
members of "Communist-front" organizations from holding "any
nonelective office or employment under the United States" " and
prohibit them from holding any employment in a defense facility unless
they disclose the fact of their membership; ' the Act further provides
that "no deduction for Federal income-tax purposes shall be allowed in
the case of a contribution to or for the use of" ' such organizations.
The Act also had made it a felony for a member of a Communist organi-
zation to apply for, use, or attempt to use a passport for foreign travel,'00
but the Supreme Court held the section unconstitutional. 10' These
provisions obviously increase the possibility, created by the registration
requirement, that an organization will be driven out of existence.
Once it is clear that the Act seeks to achieve control as well as
identification, the question becomes whether control by a means not
94 64 Stat. 996 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1964). The only decision
to pass upon this section sustained it as constitutional. Communist Party v. SACB,
223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), revd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
95 Cf. McCarran, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. Prrr. L. REv. 481,
484 (1951).
9664 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781(15) (1964).
97 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (B) (1964).
98 64 Stat. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (C) (1964). See United States v.
Robel, 254 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. Wash. 1965), prob. juris. noted, 384 U.S. 937 (1966)
(No. 83).
9964 Stat 996 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 790 (1964).
1o0 64 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
3o Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
Members of an organization ordered to register as a "Communist front" are also
subject to disabilities created by federal statutes in addition to the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 313(a) (2) (H), 66
Stat. 240 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (2) (H) (1964) (knowing membership in "Com-
munist front" bar to naturalization) ; § 340(c), 66 Stat. 261 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c)
(1964) (membership in "Communist front" during five years subsequent to naturali-
zation sufficient evidence to authorize revocation of naturalization) ; National Defense
Education Act of 1958, § 1001 (f) (4), 72 Stat. 1602, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 581 (f) (4)
(1964) (member of "Communist front" prohibited from applying for or using payment
or loan made under Act); National Science Foundation Act of 1950, § 16, 64 Stat.
156, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1874(d) (2) (1964) (member of "Communist front"
prohibited from applying for or using scholarship or fellowship awarded under Act).
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enunciated in the Act-the process of litigation-should concern a
court. The Act itself suggests that it should. The Congress that
passed the Act was surely aware that proceedings before the Board had
a unique potential for destroying an organization before a court had
had an opportunity to find that a Board order was fit for enforcement.
Congress could do little to control the damage that would result from
the proceedings themselves; the expedient of authorizing secret pro-
ceedings is neither practicable nor desirable. Congress could, however,
control the timing of the imposition of the Act's sanctions upon an
organization, and this, by deliberate design, it did. The Act provides
that an order of the Board shall become final and be given effect only
after an organization has exhausted its appellate remedies.' These
provisions reflect a congressional determination that an organization
resisting enforcement of an order of the Subversive Activities Control
Board should be protected from sanctions prior to a judicial decision
on the merits of the order; as such, they are a notable exception to
the general rule that administrative orders become effective when
issued." 3 This reading of the Act is strengthened by the fact that it
would be impermissible to attribute to Congress an intention to drive
out of existence an organization that might eventually be found on
judicial review not to be within the scope of the statute; so read, the
statute would almost surely be unconstitutional. °4
The statute itself, then, provides a basis for the argument that
a court should be concerned when the process of litigation threatens
the destruction of an organization before judicial review can be
completed. There is, to be sure, a certain irony in the argument that
the interests of an organization resisting enforcement of an administra-
tive order will best be protected by a decision on the merits now.
Courts probably believe that they are serving a private litigant's best
interests in most cases by remanding, thereby thwarting for the
moment the agency's attempt at enforcement. That will not be the
fact, however, as the discussion has suggested, when exhaustion by
litigation is a realistic possibility. When a court remands in these
circumstances, a private litigant may find further litigation too costly
and allow an order to be entered against him by default, even though
he has a defense on the merits.
A decision to remand can also have appreciable effects upon the
administrative agency that is seeking enforcement of its order. What
10264 Stat. 1001 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1964).
103 Administrative orders may, however, be stayed pending appeal in particular
cases. See Administrative Procedure Act § 705, 80 Stat. 393 (1966), 5 U.S.C. § 705
(Supp. -); 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATnm LAW TREATisE § 23.19 (1958); JAFFE ch. 18;
cf. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
104 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
19661
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are some of these effects and how are they relevant to the decision
to remand?
One of the effects that such a decision can have is to damage the
prestige and public standing of the agency, at least if the case is an
important one. 10 5 Another effect it can have is to frustrate and perhaps
demoralize the agency's staff, particularly when members of the staff
have lived with the case over a long period of time. In addition,
decisions to remand, if they become frequent, may have the effect of
discouraging good men-men who like to get things done-from accept-
ing the task of agency leadership. A decision to remand may have
these effects even though the reasons for remand, such as staleness, for
example, may not at all reflect upon the agency's competence or judg-
ment. It is not unlikely that the difficulty that the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board has encountered in winning enforcement of its
orders reflects a shrewd judicial understanding of this fact."0 6
Although a decision to remand may have these effects upon an
agency, they are not effects that are entitled to weight in a court's
determination of whether to remand, except perhaps in the rare case
in which the balance is otherwise evenly struck. These effects usually
will be too generalized to be of predictive use in a particular case.
They also have the kind of impact that administrative agencies of the
federal government ought to be stable enough to absorb; adminis-
trators, like judges, "are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate." 107 And in any event, subsequent enforce-
ment of the administrative order is still possible. If the agency on
remand can meet the court's objections, enforcement will be decreed.
105 It is possible that some decisions to remand, such as those based upon an
agency's failure to state adequate grounds for its decision, SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80 (1943), may in the long run help to strengthen an agency's prestige by
creating the conditions for improving the quality of its opinions. This is less likely
to be so when the basis for remand, such as staleness or lack of substantial evidence,
does not directly implicate the agency's policy formulations.
106 Courts may be readier to remand, in short, when they are not in sympathy
with the substantive policies that an administrative agency seeks to achieve. A court's
decision to remand may also be influenced by its estimate of the personal qualities of
the members or staff of a particular agency. "Different agencies receive different
treatment from the courts. A reputation for fairness and thoroughness that attaches
to a particular agency seeps through to the judges and affects them in their treatment
of its decisions." LANDIs, THE ADMINiSTRATrVE PROCESS 144 (1938). Although
"the reputation and standing of the [agency] for experience, discernment, detachment,
reliability, carefulness, probity and other qualities . . . cannot and should not be
ignored," 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE ff 52.03[1], at 2616 (2d ed. 1964), too great
reliance upon an estimate of these qualities in reaching a decision to remand can
present a risk: the court's estimate may be wrong. A court's opinion of an agency's
competence or reputation will not be based upon evidence taken or argument heard
in open court. More likely, it will be based upon past experiences with the agency's
decisions; these experiences may not have been representative at the time or. may
not be representative now. In addition, the court's opinion of an agency's competence
need not be submitted to the test of express announcement as a basis of decision.
107 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
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However, if it is unable to do so, enforcement if it is sought will be
denied.' Of course, an agency aware of its inability to supply the
deficiencies of the original order may elect to terminate the proceedings
without seeking enforcement a second time. This in fact is what hap-
pened on remand in American Committee and Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade; the Board, upon joint motion of counsel, vacated its
orders and dismissed the petitions of the Attorney General. 1°0 The
Board's action almost certainly was based upon a conviction that it
could not compile a "current status" record that would support a regis-
tration order. When a decision to remand leads to this cul de sac, it
no doubt has a short-run depressant effect upon the agency. This is
unavoidable so long as courts demand that administrative orders satisfy
the requirements of the statute. Still, the agency must be aware that its
present inability to enforce the statute against a particular organization
means that "the purposes of the Act, and more, are accomplished ...
[T]here is nothing about which the public needs to be informed or
from which it needs to be protected . . . . " o
One consequence of a decision to remand, however, is much more
important than those just discussed and much more relevant to a
court's determination. A decision to remand can have an effect upon
an agency's achievement of the substantive policies that have been
entrusted to its keeping."' In many cases, effective regulation re-
I 0S Eventual enforcement also may be precluded by the fortuity of changes in the
agency's membership during the period of the remand, cf. Rosenblum v. FTC, 214
F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1954); Welborn, Presidents, Regulatory Commissioners and Regu-
latory Policy, 15 J. PuB. L. 3, 13-29 (1966), or by changes in circumstances that
render the order moot. Compare Haufrecht v. SACB, 322 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
Blau v. SACB, 322 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and Labor Youth League v. SACB,
322 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1963), with Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB,
331 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1963), Patterson v. SACB, 322 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
and California Labor School, Inc. v. SACB, 322 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
109 Attorney General v. American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born, No.
109-53, SACB, April 6, 1966; Attorney General v. Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade, No. 108-53, SACB, April 20, 1966.
The same result followed on remand in International Union of Mine Workers
v. SACB, 353 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Attorney General v. International Union
of Mine Workers, No. 116-56, SACB, June 16, 1966. The Board at the same time
vacated its earlier order dismissing the Union's petition for redetermination of its
status, and entered an order dismissing the proceedings as moot. International Union
of Mine Workers v. Attorney General, No. 125-62, SACB, June 16, 1966.
See Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966), ordering remand to the
Federal Trade Commission, and Pillsbury Mills, Inc., TRADE RE. REP. (1966 Trade
Cas.) 1 17,484, at 22,759 (FTC March 28, 1966), in which the Commission responded
by dismissing the complaint.
110 Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322 F.2d 364, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
11i Two possible effects that it sometimes is said a frequent practice of remand
can have upon an agency's achievement of substantive goals may deserve mention.
A decision to remand-particularly in cases involving agencies that regulate busi-
ness practices-is a decision to postpone the enforcement of an administrative order
against a private litigant that may finally be found to have been in violation of the
statute. It is sometimes said, by analogy to the criminal law, that such a decision
dilutes the deterrent force of the statute. "No one has any real quantitative idea of
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quires prompt implementation of the agency's policy choices.11 When
time is of the essence, a decision to remand may jeopardize the agency's
ability to make its policy choices effective.'13 The decision to remand
in these circumstances may be the same decision as the determination
of the public interest on the merits.
How should a court respond to a record that it has reason to
believe is stale when a decision to remand may compromise the agency's
the deterrent force of the criminal law," much less of statutes enforced by administra-
tive agencies, although "there would, we may assume, be some." Bickel, Justice and
Protection, 37 Miss. L.J. 407, 408 (1966). By putting off the day of reckoning in
one case, the argument runs, a court may encourage businessmen to believe that it
can be put off in other cases as well. As Professor Andenaes has written of criminal
law enforcement, "The time element is important. Threats of punishment in the
distant future are not as a rule as important in the process of motivation [to comply]
as are threats of immediate punishment." Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects
of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 961 n.21 (1966). He concludes that "there
is good reason to believe that certainty of rapid apprehension and punishment would
prevent most violations." Id. at 961.
Although there is something to be said for such speculation, there is good reason
not to take it too seriously in connection with regulatory statutes. The deterrent
effect of a regulatory statute depends upon the interplay of many factors, including
the demands that compliance makes upon the regulated, an estimate of the likelihood
that the agency will discover and prosecute the violation, the stringency of the statu-
tory sanctions, the balance between the fruits that violation promises and the risks
that it runs, and the focused strength at a given moment of competitive pressures
toward violation. In addition, the deterrent force of regulatory statutes is probably
affected by the fact that often they are regarded as morally neutral, in a way that
most of the criminal law is not, and sanctions for their violation a necessary cost of
doing business. Given the many factors at play, it is doubtful that the increment
of delay in enforcement caused by remand will have more than a marginal effect on
whatever deterrent force the statute may have, even if the agency's order has been
stayed pending appeal.
It is sometimes further argued that a frequent practice of remand will dampen
an agency's ability to achieve its substantive goals in a second respect. The argument
-primarily relevant to agencies that, in Professor Fuller's term, "allocate economic
resources," FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 170-77 (1964)-proceeds as follows:
The FCC or the CAB, for example, cannot run a national system of communications
or air transportation alone; radio and television stations, airlines and air terminals,
still must be operated by private parties. If the administrative processes involved
in the regulation of these industries become protracted, private parties will be reluctant
to enter the industry or, if they are already in it, to expand their operations. Remand
would be one factor in protracting administrative proceedings. Whatever the merits
of the argument in general-they seem slight in view of the opportunities for profit
presented by an expanding economy-the possibility that remand will occur is likely
to be a marginal element in the usual business decision.
132 Recognition of this fact underlies the "emergency" doctrine and justifies sum-
mary administrative determinations pending a deliberative hearing. Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947); Adams v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) ; Miller v. Horton,
152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891) (Holmes, J.).
See also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) and JAFFE 654-86 for dis-
cussions of the problem of preserving the status quo pending administrative action.
113 The present focus on the effect of remand upon administrative agencies should
not obscure the fact that a decision to remand can also jeopardize the full effectiveness
of policy choices that Congress has embodied in a statute directing an agency to act.
In Communist Party v. SACB, 351 U.S. 115, 130 (1956), Mr. Justice Clark, dis-
senting from a decision to remand, wrote:
If all or any part of the Act is unconstitutional, it should be declared so on
the record before us. If not, the Nation is entitled to effective operation of
the statute deemed to be of vital importance to its well-being at the time it
was passed by the Congress.
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opportunity to effectuate its conception of the public interest? The
dilemma is illustrated by Radio Corp. of America v. United States. 4
After extensive hearings, the Federal Communications Commission
issued an order prescribing standards for the transmission of color
television." 5 The effect of the order was to accept a system of non-
compatible color proposed by CBS and to reject a system of compatible
color proposed by RCA. A three-judge district court entered summary
judgment sustaining the Commission,"' and RCA appealed.
The parties agreed that the Commission had the authority on a
proper record "to do precisely what it did in this case, namely, to
promulgate standards for transmission of color television that result
in rejecting all but one of the several proposed systems. Moreover,
it cannot be contended seriously that the Commission in taking such a
course was without evidential support for its refusal to adopt the RCA
system at this time." 117  Indeed, neither the parties nor the Com-
mission disputed that, if all things were equal, a system of compatible
color television was more desirable than a noncompatible system."'
But all things were not equal. Although RCA claimed that it was "on
the verge of discovering an acceptable 'compatible' system," 119 CBS
already had an acceptable system, albeit a noncompatible one. The
question could be readily framed: Was further delay in making a system
of color television available to the public too high a price to pay for
114 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
115 Second Color Television Report, 1 P & F RADIO REG. [ 91:26 (FCC 1950).
The scope of the hearings, as well as earlier attempts by the Commission to deal
with color television standards, are discussed in Comment, "Public Interest" and the
Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHi. L. REv. 802 (1951); Kirshner,
The Color Television Controversy, 13 U. PiTT. L. REV. 65 (1951).
116 Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
117 341 U.S. at 416. At oral argument, Mr. Justice Jackson had expressed concern
over the Court's competence to determine whether one system was technically superior
to the other. He remarked to Solicitor General Perlman, "The thing that bothers
me is what issues we must decide when we go into conference about the case. Must
we decide which system is technically superior or which is the better investment?
What is the scope of our review? How on earth are we going to qualify ourselves
on these technical questions?" GELLH o & BYsE, ADmINisTRATiVE LAW 530 (4th
ed. 1960) ; see Sarnoff, A Layman Looks at the Law, 24 PA. B.A.Q. 6 (1952).
118 341 U.S. at 419, 421. Under a compatible system, broadcasts in color could
be received on existing sets in black and white. Under a noncompatible system, an
adapter would be required to enable existing sets to receive color broadcasts in black
and white, and a converter to receive them in color. 341 U.S. at 412; 95 F. Supp.
at 666 n.2.
119 341 U.S. at 419. "A fair summary of the Committee's conclusions would be
that CBS had made the greatest amount of progress in the perfection of a system
with relatively limited theoretical possibilities, and that RCA had as yet made less
progress in the development of a system with greater inherent theoretical possibilities."
Comment, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U.
CHr. L. REv. 802, 807 n.34 (1951), referring to the Condon Report, prepared for the
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce by the Senate Advisory
Committee on Color Television under the chairmanship of Dr. E. U. Condon, Director
of the National Bureau of Standards. S. Doc. No. 197, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950);
see Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 660, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1950);
Kirshner, The Color Television Controversy, 13 U. Pirr. L. REv. 65, 75 (1951).
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the possibility of the development of an acceptable compatible system
at some time in the future?
The Commission thought that it was. On October 4, 1950, after
the hearings had been completed and a preliminary report issued, RCA
petitioned the Commission to reopen the proceedings to consider
improvements made in its system during the period until June 30,
1951, before reaching a final determination. On October 10, 1950,
the Commission denied the petition-to grant it "would postpone a
final decision and hence would aggravate the compatibility prob-
lem" '2 0 -and issued its order adopting the CBS system.
There was much to be said for this course. Although recognizing
that "the state of the television art is such that new ideas and new
inventions are matters of weekly, even daily occurrence," 121 the Com-
mission believed it desirable that standards be issued as soon as
possible. If the Commission were to wait, it would do so in order
to take a chance on the development of a system of compatible color.
But if the development of a compatible system finally proved un-
feasible, the Commission would have taken a chance and lost-lost
years that could have been devoted to the improvement of a non-
compatible system that it already knew was workable.' 2 In addi-
tion, the Commission could properly feel some duty, in a period of
accelerating sale of television sets that could only receive a compatible
system, to seek to limit the dislocation that would result if such a
system could not be developed."2 The Commission's decision sought
to assure the present development of a workable system of color
television and to protect the millions of Americans who would soon
be buying television sets. Nevertheless, the effect of the Commission's
course was to make a decision of profound public importance on the
basis of a record that, because of the "admittedly fluid state of the
art," 124 was in danger of becoming progressively obsolete by the week.
120 First Color Television Report, 1 P & F RADIo REG. 1f 91:24, at 91:314 (FCC
1950).
121 95 F. Supp. at 671 (dissenting opinion).
122 See Second Color Television Report, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 1 91:26, at 91:443
(FCC 1950). It should be noted that the course taken by the Commission also required
that it take chances, e.g., that manufacturers would be willing to produce sets capable
of receiving noncompatible signals, rather than await future developments by RCA,
and that the public would be willing to buy such sets.
123 It has been estimated that 7 million receivers were in use when the Commission
began hearings and 12 million by the time the Supreme Court decision was rendered.
By the end of 1953, there were 27 million sets in use. See Amendment of the Commis-
sion's Rules Governing Color Television Transmissions, 10 P & F RADIO REG. 1501
(FCC 1953) ; Comment, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regu-
lation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802, 803 (1951).
124 95 F. Supp. at 672 (dissenting opinion). Compare Cavers, Administering
That Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear Reactors-I, 68 W. VA. L. Rxv.
233, 237 (1966), discussing Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec.
Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
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The Supreme Court sustained the Commission's action in refusing
to reopen the record. The case presented a question of timing, and
thus of wisdom, said the Court, and "courts should not overrule an
administrative decision merely because they disagree with its
wisdom." 125 Was there no more to be said about the Commission's
refusal to reopen the record?
The argument that the record should be reopened had seemed
to the district court "the most plausible contention made by plain-
tiffs." 126 The court said, "It is pertinently pointed out, however, that
a number of critical findings are based upon evidence which was taken
in the earlier stage of the proceeding which is not representative of
the situation as it existed at the time the findings were adopted." 127
Moreover, RCA had offered to prove before the court "developments
since the entry of the order, which have been called to the attention
of the Commission and which it refuses to consider." 128 Yet the
court can hardly be said to have given the argument serious con-
sideration. Remand for the taking of new evidence, it said, "would
inevitably result in the prolongation of the controversy which badly
needs the finality of decision which can be made only by the Supreme
Court. In other words, the interests of all, so we think, will be
better served with this controversy on its way up rather than back
from whence it comes." 129 One judge dissented on the ground that
the Commission's "refusal to hear additional evidence clearly indicates
an abuse of discretion and constituted action which was arbitrary and
capricious," 0 but he did not elaborate the position.
If there was more to be said, the Supreme Court did not say
it either. The Court said only that "whether the Commission should
have reopened its proceedings to permit RCA to offer proof of new
discoveries for its system was a question within the discretion of the
Commission which we find was not abused." 131
Mr. Justice Frankfurter alone did not join the Court's opinion.
His divergence reflected the most basic reason possible: the Com-
mission's determination that selection of color television standards
must be made now was not in the public interest. 3 In an opinion
125 341 U.S. at 420.
126 95 F. Supp. at 667.
127 Ibid.
=28 Id. at 669.
129 Ibid. The Supreme Court rejected RCA's argument that this statement and
several others indicated that the district court had not reviewed the administrative
record as a whole. 341 U.S. at 414-16.
130 95 F. Supp. at 672 (dissenting opinion).
131 341 U.S. at 420.
132 In a later year, a c6mmentator was to write, "None can read, for one example,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's, opitiion dubitante .- ; . without -being convinced, at least
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dubitante,"3 ' he said that the Commission's decision "will require the
addition of an appropriate gadget to the millions of outstanding re-
ceiving sets at a variously estimated, but in any event substantial,
cost." ' Such an expenditure "to adapt and convert the millions
of sets now in use may well make the Commission reluctant to
sanction new and better standards for color pictures if those standards
would outmode receiving sets adapted to the system already in use." 135
Moreover, the decision would inevitably relax the incentive to develop
the more desirable compatible system. 3 '
Thus, the Commission's refusal to reopen the record was not
beyond intriguing Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
To be sure, this proffer of relevant information concerning
progress toward the desired goal was made by an interested
party. But within the Commission itself the need for further
light was urged in view of the rapid development that had
been made since the Commission's hearings got under way.
The heart of the controversy was thus put by Commissioner
Hennock: "It is of vital importance to the future of television
when history has proved the Justice right, that a most fallible judgment was being
immunized from review . . . ." Gardner, The Administrative Process, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIONs TODAY AND ToMoRRow 108, 117 n.29 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
133 See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations: "Dubitante",
1 J. PUB. LAW 198, 204 n.23 (1952).
134 341 U.S. at 421; see 95 F. Supp. at 669-70.
135 341 U.S. at 424. On this point the Commission had said:
The Commission does not imply that there is no further room for experi-
mentation. . . . Many of the results of such experimentation can undoubtedly
be added without affecting existing receivers. As to others some obsolescence
of existing receivers may be involved if the changes are adopted. In the
interest of stability this latter type of change will not be adopted unless the
improvement is substantial in nature, when compared to the amount of dis-
location involved. But when such an improvement does come along, the Com-
mission cannot refuse to consider it merely because the owners of existing
receivers might be compelled to spend additional money to continue receiving
programs.
fa .. [A]ny improvement that results from the experimentation might
face the problem of being incompatible with the present monochrome system
or the color system we are adopting today. In that event, the new color
system or other improvement will have to sustain the burden of showing that
the improvement which results is substantial enough to be worth while when
compared to the amount of dislocation involved to receivers then in the hands
of the public.
Second Color Television Report, 1 P & F RADIo REG. 1 91:26, at 91:445-46 (FCC
1950), quoted in 341 U.S. at 420-21 n.14. See also Note, Judicial Review of Ad-
ininistrative Determinations: "Dubitante", 1 J. PUB. LAw 198, 203-04 (1952).
136341 U.S. at 424. In fact, it had the effect of "touch[ing] off a frenzy of
experimental activity by RCA and NBC resulting in the recent perfecting of a com-
patible system." Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Re-
evaluation, 67 HAxv. L. Rxv. 1105, 1124 (1954). This result coincided with the
prohibition late in 1951 by the Office of Defense Mobilization of the manufacture by
CBS of color television sets. CBS also stopped broadcasting in color. See Kirshner,
The Color Television Controversy, 13 U. PITT. L. Rv. 65, 83-84 (1951). In late
1953, less than three years after the Supreme Court's decision in the RCA case, the
Commission "deleted" the rules for color television transmission there under review
and adopted RCA's compatible system. Amendment of the Commission's Rules
Governing Color Television Transmissions, 10 P & F RArno REG. 1501 (FCC 1953).
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that we make every effort to gain the time necessary for
further experimentation leading to the perfection of a com-
patible color television system." The Commission did not
rule out reasonable hope for the early attainment of com-
patibility. Indeed, it gave ground for believing that success
of experimentation to that end is imminent. But it shut off
further inquiry into developments it recognized had grown
apace because in its "sound discretion" it concluded that "a
delay in reaching a determination with respect to the
adoption of standards for color television service . . .would
not be conducive to the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
the Commission's business and would not best serve the
ends of justice .... " "'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was surely correct in saying that the
Commission's order, in originating color television, bore "far-reaching
implications to the public interest." 18 One might have hoped that an
order of such large significance would be based upon a record that
contemporaneous or impending technological developments would not
soon make obsolete. Given the public importance of the question,
RCA's promise of "enlightening new evidence," 139 and "the admittedly
fluid state of the art," 140 the case for remand becomes a strong one.
However, a decision to remand would have meant a further delay in
the effective date of the Commission's order. The Commission had
already postponed adoption of color television standards, as the Court
pointed out,'' in the hope that a compatible system would be developed.
"But this time, in light of previous experience, the Commission
thought that further delay in making color available was too high a
price to pay for possible 'compatibility' in the future .... ',,1 When
13 341 U.S. at 422.
138 Id. at 423.
139 Ibid.
140 95 F. Supp. at 672 (dissenting opinion).
141 341 U.S. at 419; see Kirshner, The Color Television Controversy, 13 U. Prrr.
L. Lv. 65, 83 n.89 (1951).
142 341 U.S. at 419. In addition, the Commission's order had been stayed during
the pendency of judicial review. At the conclusion of the hearing before the district
court, the court issued a temporary restraining order to be in effect during its con-
sideration of the case. 95 F. Supp. at 664. After it had decided the case, the court
continued the order in force "until the aggrieved parties have had an opportunity to
perfect an appeal to the Supreme Court." Id. at 671. The Supreme Court stayed
the Commission's order "pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court." Radio
Corp. of America v. United States, 340 U.S. 957 (1951).
The district court granted the stay even though it practically conceded that it
was not necessary to preserve the status quo:
It was here stated in oral argument and not disputed that there are no
adapters or converters on the market and that manufacturers would require
a period of from six to eight months before they could be made available.
So it seems reasonable to conclude that if the instant order was now in effect,
there would be no broadcasting under the proposed standards for many months,
for the simple reason that there would be no sets capable of receiving such
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a decision to remand thus jeopardizes an administrative agency's ability
to effectuate its substantive goals, it is appropriate that a court pause
before deciding that the record that supports the administrative order
is stale.
Ii
An exploration of the ways in which courts have responded to
changes in circumstances after the closing of the record in cases arising
from two agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Communications Commission, is instructive. Each agency
operates under a statute that, like the Subversive Activities Control
Act, gives its orders a prospective impact; rate orders and license
awards both take effect in the future. In cases involving these agencies,
however, remand has not always been ordered when intervening
changes have occurred. These decisions suggest that the fact of
prospective impact alone does not control the question. They further
suggest that the decision whether the intervening changes are of a
character that indicates remand-that is, whether a court will hold
that they must be made a part of the record upon which the adminis-
trative order is based-will be governed by an interplay and an accom-
modation of several other considerations that were present, but not
explicitly relied upon, in American Committee and Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
The leading Supreme Court decision remanding a case to an ad-
ministrative agency because of the staleness of the record is Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States 43  A group of railroads
and shippers sought to enjoin enforcement of a maximum-rate order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission.'44 The order, based on a
record that had closed in 1928, was issued in 1930 but was not to go
into effect until 1931. In the interim the Depression had descended.
Before the order's effective date, the carriers petitioned the Commission
for a rehearing, alleging "in great detail" the "material and important
changes in the operating, traffic and transportation conditions" they
programs. And it does not square with common sense to think that manu-
facturers would rush into the business either of manufacturing adapters and
converters for existing sets or manufacturing sets with built-in adapters and
converters while this controversy is pending. And to maintain that the public
in any considerable number would purchase adapters and converters, assuming
they were available, under the existing state of doubt and uncertainty, is to
cast a reflection on the intelligence of people.
95 F. Supp. at 670; see id. at 670-71. Compare JAFrE 693. The delay in effectuation
of the Commission's order until completion of judicial review, then, probably would
have resulted whether a stay had been issued or not.
143 284 U.S. 248 (1932).
144 164 I.C.C. 619 (1930), amended, 173 I.C.C. 511 (1931).
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now faced.14  The Commission denied the petition. It said that in
prescribing reasonable rates, "the Commission necessarily projects into
the future the results of a decision based on the conditions disclosed
in the record," that its "determination can not accurately reflect fluctu-
ating conditions," and that if the record were reopened, "when a new
determination had been reached, general conditions might again have
become normal." 148 The district court denied relief. 47
The Supreme Court found the Commission's reasoning unpersua-
sive. This was not an ordinary petition for rehearing, inviting recon-
sideration upon the original record, it said. Instead, the petition
"presented a new situation, a radically different one, which had super-
vened since the record before the Commission had been closed," and of
which the Court was prepared to take judicial notice as "the outstand-
ing contemporary fact, dominating thought and action throughout the
country." 148 Given the fact of the Depression, the Court said, "It is
plain that a record which was closed in September, 1928-relating to
rates on a major description of the traffic of the carriers in a vast
territory--cannot be regarded as representative of the conditions exist-
ing in 1931." 149 In short, the record "pertains to a different economic
era and furnishes no adequate criterion of present requirements." '50
The Commission's reasons for denying rehearing, the Court said,
"would be appropriate in relation to ordinary applications for rehearing,
but are without force when overruling economic forces have made the
record before the Commission irresponsive to present conditions." It
concluded, in language that would be quoted frequently in later de-
cisions, "This is not the usual case of possible fluctuating conditions,
but of a changed economic level." '-' Denial of the carriers' petition
for rehearing, therefore, "was not within the permitted range of the
Commission's discretion, but was a denial of a right"; rehearing was
required "by the essential demands of justice." 152
Atchison has not proven a generative precedent. The Court
"promptly restricted [it] to its special facts" 153 and has invariably
145 284 U.S. at 256.
146See Argument for Appellees, id. at 253, and the opinion of the Court. Id.
at 261.
147 Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 51 F.2d 510 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
148 284 U.S. at 260.
149 Id. at 260-61.
150 Id. at 261.
151 Id. at 261-62.
52 Id. at 262.
153 ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 515 (1944) ; see United States v.
Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 534-36 (1946).
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described them as lying at the center of its rationale.'M At the distance
of more than a generation, Atchison "stands virtually alone" '" among
Supreme Court opinions, a decision that has never been overruled and
never been followed.
Why has Atchison not proven generative, why does it stand vir-
tually alone? It is plain, as the Court's opinion stressed, that the facts
in Atchison made an extraordinary case. The magnitude of the change
created by the Depression-the "sudden, progressive, and enormous
declines of value" '" wrought in the economic order-was great. But
other events also have resulted in changes of considerable moment in
American life. There can be little doubt, for example, that the out-
break of World War II had a decisive impact "upon facilities for
transport and upon the transportation business in general" 1' and that
"the ending of hostilities by the fall of 1945 brought about a transition
from feverish war activity to the readjustment peacetime period and
produced numerous changes in conditions." 158 Yet in cases involving
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission entered shortly before
the beginning and the ending of the war, it was held that Atchison
would not support a decision to remand. The cases stress that the
Court in Atchison was responding to changes in conditions "so great
as to bring about a new economic era." 159 The changes created by
the beginning and ending of the war, while surely great, cannot be
described as having brought about a new economic era. Can Atchison's
isolation be explained, then, in terms of the magnitude of the Depres-
sion alone?
Although the possibility is tempting, such an explanation cannot
be wholly satisfying. There is no doubt that the Court in Atchison
stressed the magnitude of the change created by the Depression. But
the importance of the Depression for the Court lay primarily in the
consequences that it had for a completed administrative record; the
Depression rendered "the record before the Commission irresponsive
to present conditions," 10 so that it "furnishe[d] no adequate criterion
154 See, e.g., United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 288 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1933);
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 389 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) ; cf. Insurance Group Comm. v. Denver & R.G. W. R.R., 329 U.S. 607, 619
(1947).
155 ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 515 (1944). See 1 DAvis, ADmIN.-
ISTRATiVE LAW TREATISE § 8.18, at 603 (1958).
156 Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 149 (1936).
157 United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535 (1946)
(record closed in 1940, petition for rehearing denied in 1943).
158 Inter-City Transp. Co. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 441 (D.N.J. 1948).
159 Gardner v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 230, 232 (D.N.J. 1946) ; see 284 U.S.
at 261-62.
1,0 Id. at 262.
[Vol.115 :145
REMAND IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
of present requirements." "" These consequences, however, can result
and do result from changes in conditions after the closing of the record
that are of a lesser magnitude than the Depression. If Atchison was
based primarily upon the fact of an unresponsive record, and if changes
less catastrophic than the Depression can and sometimes do render
a record unresponsive, it is surprising that Atchison has not proven
generative. One begins to suspect that although courts have distin-
guished Atchison in terms of the magnitude of the Depression, their
decisions must reflect other considerations as well.
The precision with which the Court has described the reach of
Atchison suggests one consideration: "Only once in the history of
administrative law has this Court reversed a Commission for refusing
to grant a rehearing on the contention that the record was 'stale.' " "
One can speculate about why this is so. The Court speaks only of
cases in which an administrative agency has had an opportunity, after
its attention has been focused on particular changes in circumstances,
to exercise its discretion in passing upon a petition for rhearing.
An agency's denial of a petition may be based upon a belief that the
intervening changes in circumstances would not have led it to reach
a different result if they had occurred before the decision was made,
either because they are of insufficient weight or because they are irrele-
vant to its reasoning. Alternatively, the denial may be based upon a
belief that although the intervening events might have changed the
result had they occurred before the decision was made, the possibility
is not sufficiently strong to justify action at the rehearing stage that
would sacrifice the advantages of finality. When denial of a petition
for rehearing rests upon an assessment of the sufficiency of evidence
or a judgment about the necessity of finality, it implicates an agency's
expertise and discretion. The agency having found that reopening
would not be practicable, it is not surprising that the Court has accepted
its judgment. This is not to say that abuses of discretion in the denial
of petitions for rehearing have not occurred; it is only to say, as the
Court's carefully limiting language indicates, that those cases have not
1611d. at 261.
182 ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 515 (1944).
163 It is particularly important that an agency be afforded this opportunity when,
like the Interstate Commerce Commission, its decisions in most cases are those of
a Division of the full membership. "Under these circumstances," as the Court has
said, "what is here called a rehearing" is not a pro forma mechanism but rather
"resembles an appeal to another administrative tribunal." United States v. Abilene
& So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 281 (1924). The rule that a party must exhaust its admin-
istrative remedies, including "the administrative remedy afforded by a petition for
rehearing before the full Commission," ibid., before seeking judicial review seeks to
insure that an agency will have this opportunity. The rule, as the result in Abilene
itself suggests, is subject to exceptions. See 3 DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 20.02 (1958).
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reached the Supreme Court.' Conversely, one would expect the Court
to be less reluctant to interfere when an agency has not passed upon
the intervening changes in circumstances. This in fact was the case
in American Committee: the decision of the Subversive Activities
Control Board did not mention the contention, to which only "passing
reference" ,' had been made in oral argument, that the death of Abner
Green had rendered the record stale.'66
A second consideration suggested by Atchison as relevant to a
decision to remand is the character of the intervening changes.
Changes in the economic conditions underlying an administrative
order-a frequent allegation in cases arising from the Interstate
Commerce Commission-are often difficult to evaluate. It usually
will be easier for a court to satisfy itself that changes have occurred
than to decide that they are of a certain character or magnitude or
precision. The problem is aggravated by the diversity of the available
economic indices. In addition, trends in economic conditions, no less
than the underlying economic conditions that were thought to exist
when the record was made, are not constants; they are continually
shifting, producing "continual variations in costs and prices." "' A
court which attempts, in a world of Heraclitean flux, to describe or
to measure changes in economic conditions often will achieve only a
prismatic sense of their contours. It is doubtful that an agency in
these circumstances will be able to attain a clearer sense of the char-
acter of the intervening changes. However, even when the character
of the intervening changes is clear, remand may be unrewarding if the
agency has adjusted its order to reflect its estimate of the probability
that economic changes of this kind would occur. This is likely to be
the case with agencies, like the Interstate Commerce Commission, that
typically do their work against a background of economic change.1
68
16 4 In the distribution of judicial authority, the validity of administrative action
in most respects "is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Court
of Appeals," Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951), and of
three-judge district courts. These courts, aware of their institutional position and of
the likelihood that in most cases their review will be the last review, have remanded
in reliance, at least in part, upon the decision in Atchison. See, e.g., Oklahoma v.
United States, 193 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Okla. 1960); Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 173 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1959); cf. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
147 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
105 American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U.S. 503,
507 n2 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 504-05 n.1.
167 Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D.D.C.
1959).
108 See 2 ScHWARTZ, FRE ENrMPRISE AND EcoNomic ORGANIZATION 147-48 (3d
ed. 1966). Of course, it will not always be ,clear whether and how accurately an
agency has anticipated the probability of change. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line' R.R..v.
United States, 209 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Fla. 1962). When it is not clet, a
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Because proceedings on remand are not likely to be fruitful when the
character of the intervening changes is unclear or when the agency has
fairly anticipated them, it is understandable that courts have sustained
administrative determinations that the parties should "await the test
of actual experience." 169
A third consideration relevant to the question of remand is the
importance and permanence of the administrative decision under re-
view. Although some administrative decisions have important im-
plications for values of public concern, rate decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission are not intrinsically of this order. Their
primary impact is usually upon a single carrier-and then upon only a
segment of its business-and its customers. Rate orders also are
typically resolutions in degree, granting the petitioner a part of what it
seeks, denying it the rest. In addition, although considerations of ex-
pediency suggest that rates once prescribed should remain in effect for
some time, a rate order does not settle a matter for all time. A carrier
has the authority to make or to change rates on its own initiative, sub-
ject to Commission approval.'7 This means, as the district court said
in Atchison, that a rate order is not res judicata and "the carriers may at
any time appeal for relief from harsh situations." 171 When the impact
of an administrative order is upon only a part of a carrier's business
and when changes in circumstances occurring after entry of the order
can be presented in a new proceeding, one would expect a court to
hesitate before remanding on the ground of staleness."r Conversely,
court's determination of whether to remand becomes more difficult. If a court remands
in such a case, the agency may mechanically reach the same result that it did in its
original decision by asserting that its original decision anticipated the changes that
have occurred. Professor Jaffe, in a perceptive passage, has commented on this
possibility:
Is a remand thus futile because the agency will adhere stubbornly to that
which it has once willed? There is no doubt that to some extent such an
attitude is at work. I would suggest by way of mitigation the hypothesis that
when another case comes before it, the agency will be more disposed to follow
the judicial admonition. In other words, the effectiveness of judicial super-
vision should be judged not only in terms of the case in which the correction
was administered, but in its effect on doctrine in the long run. This is as I
have said an hypothesis for investigation. It would require a detailed exami-
nation of particular doctrines announced by the courts to determine the effect
of a judicial correction on subsequent administrative behavior.
JAFFE 589. See also Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 251 F.
Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1966).
169 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 49 (1936); cf.
Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 433 (1936).
1 7 0 See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 294 U.S. 499 (1935);
Freas, Ratemaking Powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 31 GEo. WAsH.
L. Rxv. 54, 62 (1962).
171 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 51 F.2d 510, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
172 However, if the new proceeding will differ in form significantly from the
present proceeding so that effectively it is "no substitute" for it, the court may order
that the intervening changes be heard on remand. Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d
708, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 920 (1956). See also W. S. Butter-
field Theatres, Inc. v. FCC, 237 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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one would expect a court to remand more readily when an adminis-
trative order may have a shattering impact upon private parties.
Registration orders of the Subversive Activities Control Board are
typically of this character; they expose an organization and its members
to serious sanctions, formal and informal." Although it is true that
Board orders are not res judicata since the Act makes provision for
annual redetermination proceedings, 174 these proceedings are not likely
to mitigate very much the severity of an order's impact. This is prob-
ably one of the reasons that remand was ordered in American Com-
mittee and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
These considerations-suggested as an alternative analysis to an
interpretation based on the magnitude of the Depression alone-may
explain why Atchison has not proven generative. They speak to
different concerns, however. The importance and permanence of the
decision is likely to be the central consideration in determining whether
the record should be regarded as stale. The other considerations-
whether the agency has exercised its discretion and whether the inter-
vening change is of a particular clarity-speak more to the prac-
ticability of proceedings on remand than they do to the substantive
desirability of remand as a means of achieving a statutory purpose.
How well do these considerations explain Atchison itself? Al-
though it is true that the Commission had exercised its discretion in
passing upon the intervening changes, its order had a far more
extensive impact than rate orders typically do: it related to "a major
description of the traffic of the carriers in a vast territory" 175 that
comprised the continental United States "on and west of the Mississippi
River." 176 In addition, the Court could be confident that the character
of the economic changes created by the Depression was clear, indeed
self-evident, that the changes should "be regarded not as temporary but
as at least relatively permanent," 177 and that the Commission could
not have anticipated and provided for them in its order. 7 8
173 See Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322 F.2d 364, 371-73 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
96 CONG. REc. 15712 (1950) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
17464 Stat. 998 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 792 (1964).
175 284 U.S. at 260.
176 Id. at 254 n.1.
177 Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 150-51 (1936). A year after
Atchison was decided, the Commission premised an order on the statement that "we
can not believe the present financial condition will be permanent." Johnston v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 190 I.C.C. 351, 361 (1933). The order was reversed. Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ohio 1933), aff'd, 293 U.S. 454
(1935).
178It should be added that Atchison involved a claim that was presented in part
in constitutional terms ("The carriers insisted upon this reopening as a right guar-
anteed to them not only by the Act of Congress but by the Constitution itself." 284
U.S. at 260) and that may have been resolved in part in constitutional terms, although
the Court's opinion is not as explicit on this point as it might be. It is possible that
the Court was drawn to the merits by the force of the constitutional claim.
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The considerations that helped to explain why Atchison has not
proven generative are also relevant in helping to explain why license
award decisions of the Federal Communications Commission have been
remanded with some frequency when changes of circumstances have
occurred after the closing of the record.179
In Fleming v. FCC,18° the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia (in which review of FCC decisions is exclusively lodged)
remanded because of the death of one of the two principal members
of a license applicant that had lost in the Commission's comparative
hearing. The facts were not complicated. A partnership consisting
of Fleming and McNutt, which did business as Anthony Wayne
Broadcasting, appealed the Commission's grant of a television channel
to Radio Fort Wayne, Inc., the only competing applicant. Although
the Commission had found Anthony Wayne the better qualified of the
two applicants, it decided that this superiority was outweighed by the
acquiescence of Fleming and McNutt in certain advertising practices-
regarded by the Commission as contrary to the public interest-of a
newspaper in which they held an interest. "This consideration con-
trolled the Commission's decision in favor of Radio Wayne." 181
While the case was pending on appeal, McNutt died. Although
all of the parties opposed a remand and urged the court to dispose of
the appeal on the existing record,18 2 the court could not agree:
As we have indicated, any decision on the present record
must turn on the question whether the Commission erred in
giving controlling weight to the partnership's attitude toward
and acquiescence in the imposition of a joint rate on ad-
vertisers. Clearly this consideration depended, in substantial
part, upon the mental state and conduct of a person who has
since died. The present record does not and could not include
a determination of the effect of his death since this crucial
circumstance occurred after the record closed. The Com-
mission recognizes that the death of Mr. McNutt would be
relevant to reconsideration of the case if we should reverse.
We see no reason why it is not relevant now and why we
should not have the benefit of its determination before decid-
ing whether to reverse or affirm. Accordingly, the case is
remanded to the Commission with directions to reopen the
record to the extent necessary to determine the effect of Mr.
McNutt's death and with authority to revise its decision
on appeal here."
179 See Ford, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 33-34 (1960).
180 225 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
181 Id. at 524.
182 Id. at 525.
183 Id. at 525-26.
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Fleming involved the death of a principal partner in a losing
applicant. The court also remanded, in Southland Television Co. v.
FCC,"8 4 when a principal partner of the prevailing applicant died while
the case was on appeal. The Commission had attached "the greatest
weight to the fact that a 43% partner with a good record of local
residence and civic activity will have full charge of the day-to-day
operations of the station." 188 With his death, the court said, "the fact
to which the Commission attached greatest weight, no longer exists." 8'
How relevant to Fleming and Southland are the considerations
discussed in connection with Atchison? In the first place, the change
in circumstances presented by the deaths of the principals had not
formally been passed upon by the Commission. In Fleming the
Commission had been given the opportunity to file a supplemental
brief that spoke to the question of how the court should regard
McNutt's death. In the brief, the Commission urged the court to
dispose of the case on the existing record. Yet it also recognized "that
the death of Mr. McNutt would be relevant to reconsideration of the
case if [the court] should reverse" 187 because of an error in the existing
record. Although the Commission's position perhaps can be rational-
ized by reference to a desire to act "in the interest of administrative
finality and the expeditious conduct of its affairs," '88 it risked the
appearance of impatiently brushing away McNutt's death because it
jeopardized the highest desideratum that an administrator could con-
ceive-a completed proceeding. The Commission's position, in any
event, was not reached by its formal deliberative processes; it seems to
have been no more than litigating strategy passed on to its lawyers.
And in Southland, the Commission at the time of remand apparently
had not had the opportunity to consider the intervening death at all.
Thus, the court's decisions to remand were not complicated by the
fact of having thereby to pass judgment on a formal exercise of dis-
cretion by the Commission.
Second, the nature of the intervening change in Fleming and
Southland suggested that remand could be fruitful. "There is a
finished feeling/Experienced at graves--" wrote Emily Dickinson. In
ordering a case remanded because of an intervening death-the death
of Abner Green makes American Committee a similar case-a court
can be confident of having accurately sensed its character and its per-
184 266 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
185 Id. at 687.
185 Ibid.
187 225 F.2d at 526.
188 Ford, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Federal Commuinications Com-
mission, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 25, 33 (1960).
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manence. As much cannot usually be said of a court contemplating
remand because of intervening changes in economic conditions.
There is, in addition, the fact that in Fleming and Southland the
Commission had clearly indicated that personal qualities of the de-
ceased partners-the business practices of McNutt, the local identifica-
tion of George-had been "the decisive factor" '9 or an important
consideration in its decisions. The court could be sure that the
Commission had not anticipated the death of either man and could
fairly conclude that its results might have been different had the
present state of facts existed when the cases were decided.19 When
it is this clear that an intervening event has worked "a shift in the
foundations" ' upon which an administrative decision rests, the case
for remand is persuasive, particularly when the agency has reached its
decision "upon a close margin in a closely contested comparative
consideration." 192
389 225 F.2d at 525 n.4.
190 A court ought not remand a case to an administrative agency on grounds of
staleness unless it has some sense that the intervening changes in circumstances are
relevant to the agency's standards of decision. The court need not believe it likely
that the changes in circumstances will change the administrative result-it may still
be wise to allow the agency the opportunity to pass upon them-but it ought to be
fairly clear that the changes are of a character and order to make them relevant to it.
Cf. Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717, 719 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
In some cases the intervening changes will be irrelevant as a matter of law
because recognition of them would subvert the achievement of statutory objectives.
Thus, orders of the NLRB and FTC will be enforced even though circumstances since
the closing of the record have changed by the fact that the respondent is in compliance.
NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (1950); NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co.,
339 U.S. 577 (1950); FTC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257 (1938);
Consolidated Royal Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1951).
191 Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 920 (1956).
192 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 334 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
In this case, Choate, the president of the prevailing applicant, died after oral argument
had been beard on appeal. The court in remanding said that "the Commission's find-
ings reflect that the late Mr. Choate was an important factor favorable to WHDH
and also was the cause of the demerit against the applicant." Ibid.
By varying the facts, the limits of this analysis of Fleming can be suggested.
(1) If the court's order to remand had been based upon another ground-for example,
the inconsistency of the Commission's decision with a recent decision in a similar
case, Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965), or a related case,
see 225 F.2d at 525 n.4-and McNutt had died during the pendency of the remand,
would the Commission have been required to consider the effect of his death upon
its previous decision? The answer almost certainly is yes; when proceedings on
remand have already been ordered, consideration of a subsequent change will have
a less disruptive effect than the decision to remand itself. (2) Suppose, however,
that McNutt had not died but while the case was on appeal had withdrawn from
partnership with Fleming. Would the court of appeals have ordered remand? (3)
r suppose that the court of appeals had ordered remand on another ground and
McNutt had withdrawn from the partnership while the proceedings on remand were
pending. Would the Commission have been required to consider the effect of this
change upon its original decision? The act of withdrawing from a partnership is
not irreversible; doubts about its permanence are appropriate. In addition, withdrawal
may raise the suspicion that a losing applicant is deliberately attempting to improve
its position by eliminating a cause of demerits in the first decision. It is arguable
that a court ought not allow a party while a case is on appeal to create the conditions
1966]
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Third, administrative orders of the kind involved in Fleming and
Southland have implications for the life of the community that can
hardly be overestimated. When the Commission awards a com-
munications license, it makes a decision that determines that a private
party shall be allowed the use of a channel of communication owned
by the public.' 3  It also makes a decision that determines the kind
and quality of programing that the channel will carry into
thousands and sometimes millions of homes.' The public implica-
tions of license award decisions are enlarged by the fact that in practice
they are, if not res judicata, virtually irreversible. Although the Com-
munications Act provides that a licensee must apply for renewal every
three years and authorizes the denial of renewal and revocation, 9 '
these provisions have not proven serious threats to the retention of a
license; 196 a successful applicant is likely to retain a license as long
as he wants.
A license award also has serious consequences for rejected appli-
cants; their loss is total. License awards, unlike rate orders, are not
matters of more-or-less; they are matters of all-or-nothing. In addi-
tion, a decision granting a communications license cannot ordinarily
be reopened by a rejected applicant at a time of his choosing. It is
true that a rejected applicant can oppose renewal of the licensee's permit
and seek to gain it for himself, but the chances of success will be
minimal.19 7  In these respects-the severity of the impact on losing
applicants and the comparative ineffectiveness of the redetermination
proceedings-license awards resemble registration orders of the
Subversive Activities Control Board.
When an administrative decision has such profound consequences
for the community and for private parties, it is appropriate that a
of remand in this fashion, particularly when a decision to remand will have an effect
upon other parties and upon the agency's achievement of its substantive objectives.
However, once remand has been ordered on another ground, a statutory purpose
may be served by recognition of the fact that an applicant has improved its competitive
position and may be better able than formerly to serve the public interest. But see
WHDH, Inc., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 340 (FCC 1964); Indianapolis Broadcasting,
Inc., 12 P & F RADIO REG. 883, 947-48 (FCC 1957).
193 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (1964).
'94 Cf. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
19548 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964); 48 Stat. 1086
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1964); see FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). When a licensee's performance has been of
dubious quality, the Commission may grant renewal for a period of less than three
years. See 27 FCC ANN. REP'. 37 (1961).
1963ee 31 FCC ANN. REP. 105 (1965); 30 FCC ANN. REP. 51 (1964); cf.
KWTX Broadcasting Co., 31 T.C. 952, aff'd, 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959), citing
figures from the period before the 1960 amendments to the Act, which increased the
Commission's disciplinary authority.
197Ibid. See also South Fla. Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971, 973 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 541 (1966).
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court remand because of post-record changes that might not counsel
remand in cases having less profound social implications. 9s This
course calls for particularized responses to individual cases, never an
easy task, but such responses, as Professor Jaffe has written, are "the
sign of a healthy and confident legal system, a system at once
sophisticated and sensitive." '"
One further point of comparison between Atchison and Southland
is of interest. When a case is remanded to an administrative agency
because of the staleness of the record, a full-scale rehearing will some-
times be required. In Atchison, for example, the Commission had
defended its refusal to reopen the record by arguing that "reopening
would have meant further lengthy proceedings." 200 That the Com-
mission was not exaggerating is apparent; in reaching its decision, it
had "devoted 261 days to the hearing of the part of the general investi-
gation here involved, considering testimony covering 53,000 pages
and 2,100 exhibits," 201 and a decision to remand would require a new
investigation that might be of the same proportions.
Remand will not always exact so high a price. Sometimes an
agency will be able to limit the issues on which new evidence must
be taken. At other times reconsideration can be had on the original
record without the necessity of taking any new evidence, although
oral argument or the submission of supplementary briefs may be
thought desirable. In such cases remand exacts a minimal pro-
cedural price.
The facts in Southland are illustrative. The court in remanding
had ordered the Commission to "reconsider its decision in the light
of the circumstances that, by reason of the death of Mr. Don George,
the fact to which the Commission attached greatest weight, no longer
exists"; 202 the court's order did "not prescribe the course or form
of the proceedings on reconsideration." 203 Southland then moved to
reopen the record for "a further evidentiary hearing," 204 but it did not
"make a tender of what it expected to develop at the reopened hear-
ing." 205 The Commission denied the motion, reappraised the original
198 See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79
HAmv. L. REv. 914 (1966).
199 Id. at 920.
200 284 U.S. at 261. The Court's order to remand resulted in extensive hearings
that continued until 1939. The Commission's order was finally affirmed in an opinion
that describes the course of the proceedings on remand. Board of Trade v. United
States, 314 U.S. 534, 536-37 (1942).
201 51 F.2d at 513.
202 266 F.2d at 687.
203 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 334 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
204 266 F.2d at 688.
205 Id. at 687 n.2. Had a tender of evidence been made, the Commission might
have been required to reopen the record in order to determine the comparative quali-
fications of George's successor.
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record in the light of George's death, and ordered its prior decision.
The court of appeals affirmed; it found that the Commission had not
abused its discretion in deciding the case without reopening the record.
The case was particularly appropriate for reconsideration without
reopening. The Commission's task was to determine whether an inter-
vening change in circumstances-the death of George-should alter
its original decision. Because the character of the change was clear,
its consequences could readily be estimated; because the Commission's
original opinion had measured the value of George's participation, the
consequences of his death could readily be fitted to concerns set forth
in that opinion. In these circumstances, and in the absence of an
adequate proffer of evidence, the Commission's decision to reconsider
the case without reopening the record was surely proper.
There are, then, a range of procedures which an agency might
employ on remand. To what extent should a court by its order seek
to control the agency's choice? When a decision to remand is based
upon an intervening change in circumstances, the question of whether
the court should order the agency to reopen the record or only to
reconsider the case will depend upon the clarity of the character and
consequences of the intervening event. If the character and relevance
of the intervening changes are unclear, it may be wise for the court to
leave the determination of reopening to the agency's discretion. When
a decision to remand is based upon a lapse of time since the record was
closed, the temptation to order the agency to reopen the record may
In Fleming, the court "remanded to the Commission with directions to reopen
the record to the extent necessary to determine the effect of Mr. McNutt's death and
with authority to revise its decision on appeal here." 225 F.2d at 526. Although
the language of the order seems stronger than that used in Southland, the Commission
did not read it as compelling reopening. Instead, as in Southland, it employed the
procedural device of a proffer to test the necessity of reopening:
2. . . On July 29, 1955 the Commission having before it the opinion of the
court issued an Order (FCC 55-855) wherein it took official notice of the
statement suggesting the death of Mr. McNutt and directed the parties to
file Memorandum Briefs on the questions presented by said opinion and
on the procedures to be followed by the Commission in connection therewith.
3. The parties have failed to recommend procedures as requested in our order.
None of the parties seeks to have the record reopened with the exception
of Radio Fort Wayne which asks a rehearing in the event the Commission
changes its grant. It would appear, therefore, that procedurally the parties
are desirous of a status quo with the contingent exception noted.
4. The Commission has considered the Memorandum Briefs and pleadings and
the record as it reflects the death of Mr. McNutt and is of the opinion
that such death has no effect upon Commission's Decision of September
29, 1954; that Decision awarding the grant to Radio Fort Wayne, Inc.
not having been based solely upon the participation of Mr. McNutt in the
Anthony Wayne applicant.
5. In view of the foregoing, IT Is ORDmzE, This 7th day of December, 1955,
that the record of the proceeding including the Decision therein Is RVsE)
to reflect the death of Paul V. McNutt and that no further revision is made
of the Commission's Decision in the proceeding.
Radio Fort Wayne, Inc., No. 10424, FCC, Dec. 7, 1955.
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be great. However, such an order would foreclose the agency from
testing the necessity of reopening, as the Commission did in Southland,
by the adequacy of a proffer of evidence. Although this course creates
the risk that the agency will subsequently be found to have abused its
discretion in refusing to reopen, it has the plain advantage of bringing
the agency's expertise and familiarity with the case to bear on the de-
cision whether to reopen. As the Franks Committee said, sometimes
eta wise expediency is the proper basis of right adjudication, and the
decision must be left with a Minister." 206
When a court orders a case remanded to an administrative agency
because the record is stale, it decides that on balance certain considera-
tions should prevail over the value of bringing finality to the proceed-
ings. The concept of staleness does not tell what these considerations
will be in a particular case. Staleness, as Mr. Justice Stone said of
reasonableness, "is not a concept of definite and unchanging content.
Its meaning necessarily varies in the different fields of law, because it
is used as a convenient summary of the dominant considerations which
control in the application of legal doctrines." 207
I have tried to indicate what some of these considerations may be.
The discussion of American Committee and Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade suggested the importance of statutory policy as a
source of the requirement that an administrative order be based on a
"current status" record. The discussion of Atchison and Fleming
suggested the importance of the order's implications for values of public
concern, itself an aspect of statutory policy. Although these considera-
tions are likely to be the primary ones in particular cases, they are not
the only ones relevant to a decision to remand because of the staleness
of the record. I have tried to explore the significance of some other
considerations: the pressure of "serious constitutional questions," the
probable usefulness of additional factual information, the extent to
which a court's equity powers are implicated, the hints and guesses
about change that the history revealed in the record would suggest,
the degree to which the statutory design seeks to create private rights
such as a limitation of the impact of administrative proceedings upon
private litigants, the consequences of remand for the agency's ability
to make its policy choices effective, whether the agency has already
exercised its discretion in passing upon the intervening changes, the
clarity of the character and consequences of the changes.
.206 Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, Report, Ctm. No. 218,
at 6 (1957). See also WADE, ADM INISTRATIVE LAW 67-68 (1961).
207 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
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In seeking to reach a sensitive accommodation among these con-
siderations, a court ought not allow the value of bringing finality to
administrative proceedings to be obscured. Finality is more than a
slogan; it is a concession to reality. As the Supreme Court has said,
"If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehear-
ings as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some
new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would
be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consum-
mated in an order that would not be subject to reopening." '08 A
court must make its peace with the existential fact that neither the
administrative process nor the judicial process can hope to keep full
pace with a universe of change. The problem was already old when
Marvell wrote, "Had we but world enough, and time ... 
208 ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 514 (1944).
